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THE REVELATORY NATURE OF COVID-19 
COMPASSIONATE RELEASE IN AN AGE OF MASS 
INCARCERATION, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS, AND 
MENTAL HEALTH REFORM 
 
Jennifer A. Brobst 
 
“Thucydides, describing the anarchy that followed the plague at Athens, 
suggests how men, unrestrained from human laws and made cynical by 
disaster about divine ones, lapse into lawlessness. Retribution needs to be 
secure to be effective as a prudential argument; very often it is not.”  
- MARY MARGARET MACKENZIE, PLATO ON PUNISHMENT 113 (1981). 
ABSTRACT 
 The crime victim rights movement and mass incarceration grew side-
by-side in the United States, and in many ways they deal with similar 
questions about the purposes, benefits, and effectiveness of the criminal 
justice system. Among the dominant criminal justice theories, retribution 
continues to receive stalwart support as an assurance of justice, but also as a 
possible form of penance and individual and societal healing. This is in some 
tension, however, with the prevalence of atypical neurology among prisoners 
and the associated push for treatment rather than punishment for those 
deemed less accountable for the harm they cause.. The COVID-19 worldwide 
pandemic in 2020 tested the value attributed to retribution, rehabilitation, and 
other criminal justice goals in sentencing and incarceration. Specifically, the 
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First Step Act of 2018 enhanced discretionary compassionate release from 
prison due to illness and disability, requiring a post-sentencing balance of 
interests between perceived risks to the prisoner while in prison and risks to 
the public if release were granted. Early COVID-19 compassionate release 
decisions reveal that courts continue to base early release decisions primarily 
on an assessment of public safety risk from crime, not community impact, 
crime victim impact, or even prisoner health. In so doing, judges and 
prosecutors usurp and marginalize the role of the community and those most 
affected by crime. Greater consideration of community and crime victims’ 
perspectives would better serve justice, and its goals of retribution and 
rehabilitation.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mass incarceration in the United States is finally being identified by 
policymakers as harmful to society and the result of ineffective efforts to 
combat crime and protect the public, particularly the “War on Drugs.”1 Why 
high levels of incarceration is problematic is a complex question, but many 
prisoners have a serious diagnosable mental health disorder, including 
neuroatypical conditions such as substance abuse addiction, intellectual 
disabilities, or mental illness.2 Inequities are compounded by the fact that in 
both state and federal jurisdictions, offenders who are caught in the net of the 
criminal justice system are disproportionately young, African American or 
Hispanic men who are relatively poor with less formal education.3 What is 
more, low income men of color caught within the trap of mass incarceration 
 
1 See, e.g., First Step Act of 2018, P.L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (aiming, 
through bipartisan legislation, to reduce mass incarceration of nonviolent offenders); 
see generally Andrea Craig Armstrong, The Missing Link: Jail and Prison 
Conditions in Criminal Justice Reform, 80 LA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2019); Susan Stuart, 
War as Metaphor and the Rule of Law in Crisis: The Lessons We Should Have 
Learned from the War on Drugs, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1 (2011). 
2 See E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, NCJ NO. 230531, MORE 
MENTALLY ILL PERSONS ARE IN JAIL AND PRISONS THAN HOSPITALS: A SURVEY OF 
THE STATES (2010), available at https://www.ojp.gov/library/abstracts/more-
mentally-ill-persons-are-jails-and-prisons-hospitals-survey-states. 
3 See generally Brett Dignam, Learning to Counter Mass Incarceration, 48 
CONN. L. REV. 1217, 1220 (2016) (addressing the need for more educational services 
to the prison population, disproportionately comprised of “young black men who 
dropped out of high school”). 
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comprise a population group less likely to have access to quality medical and 
mental health services from a young age.4  
Also, with the increase in urbanization and illegal drug use in the 
United States, by the 1960s, a burgeoning middle-class victims’ rights 
movement5 arose in response to the sharp increase in rates of property and 
violent crime. Police purportedly were unable to address the spike adequately 
and crime victims were reluctant to cooperate with no possibility of victim 
compensation or voice at sentencing.6 However, those most fearful of crime 
in the United States were those who lived in low-income communities, who 
had less access to transportation and personal security measures, felt little 
trust toward law enforcement, and feared retaliation by offenders.7 This 
community of crime victims witnessed mass incarceration differently than 
the policymakers.  
In the 1990s, during the height of the Clinton tough-on-crime era, 
criminologist Michael Tonry stated that communities afflicted with inner city 
drug-related crime did not want mass incarceration and police crack downs; 
they wanted “more drug treatment, more early childhood programs, and more 
 
4 See generally MELISSA THOMPSON, RACE, GENDER, AND MENTAL ILLNESS IN 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 111 (2005) (finding that African-Americans are least 
likely to be psychologically evaluated in the criminal justice system); M. Gregg 
Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & 
ETHICS 95, 108 (2001) (“Working poor and unemployed patients, especially the 
uninsured, tend to find their way to a bottom tier of public clinics staffed by rotating 
house officers and salaried attendings with little institutional cache.”). Studies have 
also shown that offenders have a three to six times higher rate of having a sexually 
transmitted infection than the non-offender population, with higher rates among 
women than men, and higher rates among Black offenders than White offenders. 
Sarah E. Wiehe et al., Epidemiology of Sexually Transmitted Infections Among 
Offenders Following Arrest or Incarceration, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Dec. 2015, 
at e26, e28 (studying approximately 250,000 Marion County, Indiana offenders 
between 2003–2008). 
5 The term “victim” will be used throughout for consistency with related victim 
rights legislation, but the author acknowledges the importance and greater accuracy 
of the alternative term “survivor”, as well as the dignity demanded by the person first 
movement. 
6 LESLIE W. KENNEDY & VINCENT F. SACCO, CRIME VICTIMS IN CONTEXT 51 
(1998). 
7 See JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON: 
IDEOLOGY, CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 170 (8th ed. 2007); KENNEDY & SACCO, 
supra note 6, at 116–17. 
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crime prevention initiatives.”8 Indeed, mandatory sentencing and mass 
incarceration undermined the ability of offenders to provide victims of crime 
with restitution, which again disproportionately impacted low-income 
communities, where victims most needed restitution.9 Mandatory sentencing 
also reduced the potential influence and relevance of crime victim impact 
statements at sentencing.10 
Mandatory sentencing guidelines, such as the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, ensured an 
increase in arrests in minority communities with a focus on particular 
controlled substances, such as crack cocaine, rather than promoting the 
treatment of addiction.11 By 1994, every state had mandatory sentencing 
laws.12 The continuing legacy of the War on Drugs has criminalized certain 
conduct that disproportionately impacts low-income communities of color, 
while declining to criminalize other significantly harmful activity, such as 
white collar crime, industrial disasters, or political corruption - crimes that 
would address a different, more affluent, demographic of offender.13 Due to 
recidivism, reincarceration, and long prison sentences, many of these young 
offenders find themselves eventually aging in prison, resulting in a growing 
proportion of much older inmates with serious medical and mental health 
needs.14 As stated before Congress: 
 
8 KENNEDY & SACCO, supra note 6, at 129; see also Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear 
and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in 
Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219 (2000). 
9 See REIMAN, supra note 7, at 170; ROBERT ELIAS, VICTIMS STILL: THE 
POLITICAL MANIPULATION OF CRIME VICTIMS 40–41 (1993). 
10 ELIAS, supra note 9, at 94. 
11 CONTROLLING THE DANGEROUS CLASSES: A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
IN AMERICA 50–54 (Randall G. Shelden ed., 2d ed. 2008).  
12 HEATHER AHN-REDDING, THE “MILLION DOLLAR INMATE”: THE FINANCIAL 
AND SOCIAL BURDEN OF NONVIOLENT OFFENDERS (2007). 
13 See generally REIMAN, supra note 7, at 30; KENNEDY & SACCO, supra note 6, 
at 58–59. 
14 See generally Lindsey E. Wylie et al., Extraordinary and Compelling: The 
Use of Compassionate Release Laws in the United States, 24 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 216, 216–217 (2018) (finding that inmates age 50 and older are the fastest 
growing population segment in the United States prison system). A number of state 
and federal appeals relate to age-related mental disorders among prisoners, 
particularly Alzheimer’s disease. See, e.g., Wilson v. Adams, 901 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 
2018) (affirming a motion for summary judgment on a constitutional deliberate 
indifference and medical malpractice state claim); Dahl v. Miles, 2017 WL 3600397 
(D. Minn. Aug. 20, 2017) (denying on procedural grounds a habeas corpus claim for 
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Our Nation's Federal prison population is rapidly aging. Of 
the 1.5 million adults currently in State and Federal prisons, 
there has been a 300 percent spike in the elderly population 
since 1999. By 2050, it is estimated that one-third of the 
prison population of the United States will be over age 50.15 
Many thoughtful and perceptive grassroots advocates and concerned 
scholars have addressed the factors impacting mass incarceration mentioned 
above, but few have considered the role of crime victims in the conversation. 
This is particularly unfortunate, for many offenders have also been victims 
of crime. For example, one petitioner for compassionate release from prison 
during the pandemic had convictions for firearms offenses and domestic 
violence; had spent half of his life in prison after a childhood in which he had 
been hospitalized due to physical abuse by the grandfather who raised him; 
and received diagnoses for PTSD, depression, and impulse control disorder.16 
Victims and offenders in such cases come from the same communities and 
face similar societal barriers and prejudices.17  
As will be discussed below, the crime victim rights movement has 
been subject to efforts at manipulation and stereotyping by both offender 
advocates and state agents.18 Victims of crime are not bent on revenge 
regardless of the cost, nor are they without compassion for the serious and 
negative impacts of excessive incarceration and the societal neglect of 
medical and mental health needs of inmates. Tough-on-crime government 
 
conditions of confinement, including denial of medications to forestall the 
progression of Alzheimer’s disease); Stackhouse v. State, 2015 WL 4381703, at *5 
(Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. July 17, 2015) (affirming the denial of postconviction relief 
to a 77-year-old sexual offender with Alzheimer’s disease, in addition to having 
Parkinson’s disease, diabetes, and high blood pressure); State v. Kirby, 173 Wis. 2d 
307 (1992) (noting the “inability of the prison system to provide adequate 
supervision for an elderly person with his chronic frailties of mind”).  
15 Good Conduct Time Credits for Certain Elderly Nonviolent Offenders, H.R. 
Rep. No.116-192, at H9191116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Rep. Ted Deutch 
addressing the Second Chance Act of 2007).  
16 U.S. v. Cannon, 2021 WL 231100, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2021). 
17 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, NCJ No. 255578, 
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION BY RACE OR 
ETHNICITY, 2005-2019, (2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vvre0519.pdf 
(finding, in 2005, 32.7 violent victimizations per 1,000 black persons age 12 or older 
and 27.7 violent victimizations per white persons, falling to 18.7 for black persons 
and 21.0 for white persons in 2019); KENNEDY & SACCO, supra note 6, at 14 
(identifying research showing that the most likely victim of violent crime in the 
United States is a young, black male who knows his offender). 
18 See generally ELIAS, supra note 9. 
2021] The Revelatory Nature of COVID-19  205 
voices have selectively lifted up only certain crime victims in the public eye, 
profiling middle-class white victims who are far from typical for those most 
victimized by crime while repeatedly portraying poor communities of color 
as hardened criminals who choose to be so, even if they are subject to 
victimization.19 Examples of the government’s choice to adopt primarily 
public health approaches to the opioid crisis and fetal alcohol syndrome, 
which impact middle-class communities, contrast vividly with the 
criminalization of pregnant women who use crack cocaine or heroin in 
predominantly low-income communities of color.20 All crime victim voices 
are valuable, but more crime victims and more representative crime victims 
need to weigh in for criminal justice reform to effectively incorporate a crime 
victim rights perspective. This is more important than ever as the American 
middle class shrinks and the divide between rich and poor grows ever 
greater.21 
History matters here. While each addressed different concerns, the 
crime victim rights movement and the rise of mass incarceration largely 
began during the same post-1960s period.22 Yet, as fierce public policy 
debates about the causes and effectiveness of mass incarceration continue, 
the quiet and modest progress of the crime victim rights movement has 
continued to proceed relatively independently. However, it could be joining 
more actively with immigrant rights, consumer protection, racial justice, 
defendants’ rights, and other civil rights organizations to alleviate the causes 
of social inequity that lead to much crime. Although crime victim rights are 
 
19 See KENNEDY & SACCO, supra note 6, at 15 (suggesting that portraying 
victims of crime who are poor and of color as receiving their just deserts alleviates 
middle class guilt for failing to take responsibility for social inequity); ELIAS, supra 
note 9, at 40–41(stating that the 1982 Presidential Task Force on Victims of Crime 
selectively protected an unrepresentative group of crime victims, “not lower-class 
minorities”). 
20 See, e.g., Angela P. Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, The Civil Rights of Health: A 
New Approach to Challenging Structural Inequality, 67 UCLA L. REV. 758, 803 
(2020) (“Although the crack baby phenomenon proved not to be real after continued 
medical and public health research, the panic led to widespread criminal and 
administrative sanctions against pregnant women, especially poor Black and brown 
women, and the effects of this stigmatizing public policy are still being felt today.”). 
21 See PETER TEMIN, THE VANISHING MIDDLE CLASS: PREJUDICE AND POWER IN 
A DUAL ECONOMY (2017) (asserting that wage stagnation, racial segregation, and 
mass incarceration are components of a deliberate policy to maintain a cheap labor 
force and ensure high profits for the wealthy few); SHELDEN, supra note 11, at 320 
(finding that as of 2005 one-third of African-American men had been in jail, prison, 
probation or parole).  
22 See infra Part II. 
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of relatively recent origin, and a remarkable achievement for all victims of 
crime, they take a narrow view of the crime victim’s experience. That is, the 
crime victim rights movement has hesitated to focus on reform of the justice 
system as a whole, the needs of the defendant, and the diversity of members 
of the community. The history of criminal sentencing theory, in turn, has 
patently ignored the role of crime victims, most of whom are far more likely 
to understand the context within which the crime occurred than a judge or 
other government agent far removed from the realities of the defendant’s 
community and life experience. If their experiences were given more weight, 
crime victims could have offered a perspective that would have helped the 
criminal justice system avoid the unfortunate path of mass incarceration and 
its terrible costs to so many both in and out of prison.  
This dearth of victim-impact perspective is seen most poignantly 
now, at a time when neuroatypical offenders and other inmates with medical 
conditions have faced the terrifying risk of death in prison due to the COVID-
19 pandemic. The rapid and necessary spate of compassionate release claims 
filed on behalf of inmates with conditions that place them at greater risk of 
the contagion have vividly reflected the priorities and inequities of the 
criminal justice system. With little time for reflection given the rapid spread 
of the contagion, court and prison authorities have repeatedly emphasized 
community protection from recidivism and notions of retribution first, 
devaluing yet again the perspectives of those offenders and victims already 
marginalized in the justice system. As a poignant example, it was reported 
that North Carolina state officials designed a strict policy during the 
pandemic of refusing compassionate release to any prisoner convicted of a 
violent crime, even if she was pregnant and her sentence was nearly 
complete.23  
This article will address, in Part II, the intersection of the history of 
mass incarceration in the United States and the development of crime victim 
rights, highlighting the impact of mental health research on both. Part III 
evaluates traditional sentencing theories against the benefits and risks of 
mental health goals and the interests of crime victims and defendants. Finally, 
Part IV specifically examines how public health crises, such as the COVID-
 
23 See Hannah Critchfield, Pregnant NC Prisoner Hopes of Release Fading, 
N.C. HEALTH NEWS (June 17, 2020), 
https://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2020/06/17/pregnant-nc-prisoners-hopes-
of-release-fading/. 
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19 pandemic, reveal the priorities of the criminal justice system and its 
disregard of marginalized community voices in favor of state control.  
II. THE PARALLEL HISTORY OF MASS INCARCERATION AND 
CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS 
Several patterns mark the parallel history of mass incarceration and 
the crime victim rights movement. Aside from occurring during the same era, 
following the Civil Rights era of the 1960s and 1970s, both responded to the 
tough-on-crime political climate of the subsequent 1980s and 1990s, and 
both were strongly supported by President Reagan, President Bush, and 
President Clinton.24 However, they did not speak to the same types of crimes.  
A. Legal Recognition of the Mental Health Needs of Crime 
Victims and Offenders 
While mass incarceration emerged from public fears related to the 
rise in property crimes and homicides connected to increased availability of 
illegal drugs, the movement for victims’ rights arose from both medical 
recognition of child abuse and the women’s movement, which recognized 
that women victims of interpersonal and family violence were wholly 
marginalized in the criminal courts.25 Nonprofit crisis centers arose largely 
serving women and child victims of crime, with a tenuous recognition of the 
importance of race and class on the incidence of violence, aiming instead for 
an alliance with government.26  
 
24 See Eliav Lieblich & Adam Shinar, The Case Against Police Militarization, 
23 MICH. J. RACE & L. 105, 115 (2017–2018). 
25 See Kristin N. Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile 
Court?: Retributive v. Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1110 
(2009) (reviewing the historical development of crime victims’ rights); Karen-Lee 
Miller, Purposing and Re-Purposing Harms: The Victim Impact Statement and 
Sexual Assault, 23 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 1445, 1449 (2013) (finding in a study 
of victims of sexual assault that their victim impact statements emphasized the 
opportunity to be recognized by the court, where their experiences of “marginality 
and stigma” by the legal system had exacerbated their feelings of emotional distress 
from the crime).  
26 See ELIAS, supra note 9, at 47–48 (“[T]he victims movement we know has not 
fundamentally challenged U.S. society on its crime-control strategies, social policies, 
or otherwise.”); Office of Victims of Crime, Introduction and Executive Summary, 
OVC ARCHIVE, https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/repcong/intro.htm (last 
accessed Mar. 6, 2021) (stating that the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) of 1984 
provided extensive funding for “pioneering partnerships” that included children's 
advocacy centers, victim services centers, and interdisciplinary violence against 
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Mandatory reporting of child abuse and mandatory arrest and 
prosecution of domestic violence marked a serious systemic reach into the 
lives of families that was needed to curb the retributory nature of 
interpersonal violence, but the policies also enhanced the state control of 
offenders through incarceration.27 As a movement, sympathy was difficult to 
find among advocates for battered women or victims of sexual violence with 
respect to the offender’s related substance abuse, putting forth the highly 
prominent theme that violence is a choice to exert power and control, not a 
result of a mental health disorder.28 Victims of violence sought accountability 
and respect from the justice system, which political figures put to their own 
use. Child victims of abuse and neglect were too young to fully exercise their 
victim rights in the justice system in a meaningful way, which led advocates 
and the State to speak for them.29  
Remarkably, at this time the most common victim of violent crime 
was a young man who looked much like the most common convicted 
offender – a low-income, young man of color facing economic challenges 
and hardship since birth. There were no crime victim advocacy centers for 
these young men.30 Instead, their advocates in the criminal justice system 
 
women programs in order to “reduce the number of victim interviews, provide 
settings especially designed for victims, and increase collaboration between criminal 
justice and victim service agencies”). 
27 See KENNEDY & SACCO, supra note 6, at 105 (describing interpersonal 
violence as seen as retribution in the home). 
28 E.g., ECHO A. RIVERA ET AL., NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TRAUMA 
& MENTAL HEALTH, AN APPLIED RESEARCH PAPER ON THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE 1 (2015) (“IPV 
[interpersonal violence] is best understood as an ongoing pattern of power and 
control in romantic relationships that is enforced by the use of abusive tactics, such 
as intimidation, threats, physical or sexual violence, isolation, economic abuse, 
stalking, psychological abuse, and coercion related to mental health and substance 
use.” (internal citation omitted)). 
29 See Lisa Kelly & Alicia LeVezu, Until the Client Speaks: Reviving the Legal-
Interest Model for Preverbal Children, 50 FAM. L.Q. 383 (2016); Marlene A. Young 
Interview Transcript, ORAL HISTORY OF THE CRIME VICTIM ASSISTANCE FIELD 
VIDEO AND AUDIO ARCHIVE, UNIV. OF AKRON (Feb. 24, 2003), 
http://vroh.uakron.edu/transcripts/Young.php (founding Executive Director of the 
National Organization for Victim Assistance). 
30 See Eric Stiles et al., Serving Male-Identified Survivors of Intimate Partner 
Violence, NAT’L RESOURCE CTR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 8 (July 2017), 
https://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/2017-07/NRCDV_TAG-
ServingMaleSurvivors-July2017.pdf (noting that the prevalence of women-focused 
names of crisis centers “limits males’ ability to see themselves as victims and find 
their way to service providers”). 
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rose up from the ranks of criminal defense, stating that their clients were 
victims of the system. Discussion of childhood victimization did, however, 
become important in sentencing hearings.31 Those who regularly worked 
with child victims of crime could not help but recognize the pattern of victim 
as offender, and offender as victim in communities with little social and 
economic support.32 While politicians raged about the hardened criminal or 
professional criminal class, they targeted the poorest and least politically 
powerful rather than the professional affluent classes who, in the 1980s and 
beyond, were rigging the economy and creating an ever widening class 
division.33 
Crime victims were pitted politically against criminal offenders, 
which made little sense, particularly when constitutional rights generally 
focus on curbing the arbitrary and inequitable use of state power.34 The 
primary concern for both victim and offender was always the workings of the 
criminal justice system itself and those who pulled its levers. In the 
meantime, gains were made in the medical and mental health communities, 
particularly since the 1990s.35 For example, pharmacological treatments for 
serious mental illnesses such as bipolar disorder were developed, new best 
practices and identification for posttraumatic stress disorder and chronic 
 
31 See, e.g., Craft v. State, NO. SC19-953, 2020 WL 6788794 (Fla. Nov. 19, 
2020) (holding that the trial court properly weighed defendant’s history of childhood 
trauma as a mitigating factor at sentencing); Eaton v. State, 192 P.3d 36 (Wyo. 2008) 
(holding that a murder defendant was not provided with ineffective assistance of 
counsel at the penalty stage when counsel failed to investigate and present certain 
mitigating abusive events in the defendant’s childhood).  
32 See generally David Finkelhor et al., Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency 
Prev., How the Justice System Responds to Juvenile Victims: A Comprehensive 
Model, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Dec. 2005), 
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/210951.pdf.  
33 See Lucian E. Dervan & Ellen S. Podgor, “White-Collar Crime”: Still Hazy 
After All These Years, 50 GA. L. REV. 709 (2016); Eli Wald, Serfdom Without 
Overlords: Lawyers and the Fight Against Class Inequality, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. 
REV. 269 (2016); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L REV. 
1795 (1998). 
34 See KENNEDY & SACCO, supra note 6, at 57. 
35 See generally DSM History, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/history-of-the-dsm (outlining 
the history of the evolving classification of mental disorders in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Classification 
of Diseases). 
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depression were implemented, and gains were made in understanding the 
nature of cognitive disabilities that are relevant to the justice system.36  
This modest renaissance in mental health research led offender 
advocates in the new millennium to rightly argue that incarceration was more 
inhumane and unjust for some with such mental health challenges. The 
victim advocacy movement remained relatively silent, focusing instead on 
the mental health gains in treatment for victims with these same conditions. 
It demanded restitution from offenders for the costs of such treatment but 
said little about the meaning of justice for similarly neuroatypical offenders. 
Rehabilitation as a sentencing goal gained new life with new treatments,37 
but also created the serious new risks of adding to the state’s power public 
health surveillance and medically anesthetizing a population of low-income 
communities of color already disproportionately impacted by state control.  
In the last half-century, the medical and mental needs of both 
convicted offenders and victims of crime have received substantially more 
attention than in decades past.38 In 1972 in Jackson v. Indiana, the United 
States Supreme Court held that substantive due process rights, specifically 
the liberty interests of detained persons with intellectual disabilities, may 
override the police power interest in community safety and allow for pretrial 
release.39 In 1994 in Farmer v. Brennan, the Court put forth that, pursuant to 
the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, “[t]he 
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit 
inhumane ones” when reviewing whether a state facility had been 
deliberately indifferent to the petitioner’s health needs.40 In Atkins v. Virginia 
in 2002, the Court questioned the utility of imprisonment and capital 
punishment of offenders with cognitive disabilities who do not meet the 
 
36 Walter Alexander, Pharmacotherapy for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in 
Combat Veterans, 37 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS J. 32 (2012) (discussing the co-
morbidity and treatment of bipolar, schizophrenia, and posttraumatic stress disorder). 
37 Richard Williams, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Addressing Mental 
Health in the Justice System, 23 LEGISBRIEF (Aug. 2015), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/addressing-mental-
health-in-the-justice-system.aspx.  
38 See Executive Summary: Final Report of the APA Task Force on the Victims 
of Crime and Violence, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107, 108 (1985) (“It is clear from 
research evidence that loss of personal property and/or bodily injury, commonly 
thought of as the most unsettling aspect of victimization, may in fact be of less 
importance than the psychological damage suffered by the victim.”). 
39 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972). 
40 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). 
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criteria for involuntary commitment but cannot easily be rehabilitated or 
deterred from future offending by imprisonment alone.41 In 2005 in Roper v. 
Simmons, the Court acknowledged both international human rights 
protection of minors and research on the adolescent brain as less developed 
than previously understood when it abolished the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders.42 Indeed, the unduly harsh conditions of prison that more 
vulnerable offenders experience has led to an array of constitutional 
challenges, most recently with respect to the restriction on the insanity 
defense in state jurisdictions,43 as well as the mental health impact of solitary 
confinement and the risk of assault in prison.44 Thus the criminal justice 
system, since the 1960s, responded to the development of mental health 
research with calls for the dignity and constitutional protection of both crime 
victim and offender.  
B. The Crime Victim Rights Movement Appeals to Justice 
Criminal justice was originally less of a structured system under 
British common law, where the prosecutor was usually the victim and, if 
poor, had little ability to compensate witnesses or ensure effective court 
processes.45 This also shaped the early history of the American criminal 
justice system.46 Initially, American jails were temporary holding facilities 
where many punishments involved capital punishment, whipping, branding 
and other mutilation, or being sent to serve the victim as laborer.47 In Britain, 
given the strict class structure and the “savagery of the law” of property 
crimes, victims were known to openly “hesitate to play a part,” recognizing 
 
41 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (“This consensus unquestionably 
reflects widespread judgment about the relative culpability of mentally retarded 
offenders, and the relationship between mental retardation and the penological 
purposes served by the death penalty.”). 
42 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
43 See Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020). 
44 See generally Jennifer A. Brobst, The Metal Eye: Ethical Regulation of the 
Use of Technology to Observe Humans in Confinement, 55 CAL. W.L. REV. 1 (2018). 
45 GEORGE RUDÉ, CRIMINAL AND VICTIM: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EARLY 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 89–90 (1985). 
46 See KENNEDY & SACCO, supra note 6, at 50 (discussing the lack of public 
police or prosecutors in colonial America); Paul G. Cassell & Margaret Garvin, 
Protecting Crime Victims in State Constitutions: The Example of the New Marsy’s 
Law for Florida, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99, 102–03 (2020) (citing William 
F. McDonald, Toward a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of 
the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649 (1976)). 
47 HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 149 (1988). 
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that the death penalty was an unjust punishment for stealing.48 By the mid-
nineteenth century in England, the death penalty had been abolished for such 
crimes, but metropolitan police departments emerged to keep the peace 
against labor and political riots in a Dickensian rising industrialized society.49 
In the United States, post-Civil War prisons in the late nineteenth century 
housed debtors, vagrants, and served as the “depository” for the mentally 
ill.50 
Historian George Rudé found in early British records that the new 
police officers, primarily from the class of laborers, craftsmen, and ex-
soldiers, would engage in acts of entrapment, aggression against vagrants, 
and interfere with victims who recommended “mercy.”51 Jurors also resisted 
through nullification of the harsh criminal laws against property offenders, 
which they felt were “devised by a landlord-dominated Parliament.”52 Seen 
in retrospect, Rudé argues that the British common law in the early Industrial 
Age reflected “an increasingly central and omnicompetent State” comprised 
of the poor, a new working class, middle-class Radicals, and “the 
replacement of one class system of justice by another; an aristocratic system 
geared to the land by one created in the image of a commercial and 
manufacturing middle class.”53 Despite the new middle class strata serving 
as a bridge in the legal system between the working class and upper class, 
Rudé acknowledges that “[t]here was still the presumption that a poor man, 
particularly one without movable possessions or a home of his own, was a 
potentially dangerous malefactor who could be detained with impunity.”54  
However, in the early 1900s, the more heavily populated regions of 
the United States aimed for reformatory prisons, focusing on rehabilitation 
and implementing parole boards that used new scientific psychological 
testing to determine levels of dangerousness.55 Analogizing prison reform to 
hospital treatment led to indeterminate sentencing at the turn of the 
nineteenth century and the classification of prisoners by perceived 
dangerousness, such as recidivists and sex offenders.56 Thus, the new 
 
48 RUDÉ, supra note 45, at 89. 
49 Id. at 90, 98. 
50 JOHNSON, supra note 47, at 150. 
51 RUDÉ, supra note 45, at 98–99. 
52 Id. at 109. 
53 Id. at 116. 
54 Id. at 119–20. 
55 JOHNSON, supra note 47, at 229.  
56 SHELDEN, supra note 11, at 169–70. 
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criminal justice systems in Britain and the United States reflected the class 
divisions and fears of a changing society, as well as the hopes of new science. 
By the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court began to frame these 
concerns more frequently as social injustice, as seen in the concurring 
opinion of Justice Douglas in Furman v. Georgia, addressing the imposition 
of the death penalty:  
Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark has said, ‘It is the 
poor, the sick, the ignorant, the powerless and the hated who 
are executed.’ One searches our chronicles in vain for the 
execution of any member of the affluent strata of this 
society. The Leopolds and Loebs are given prison terms, not 
sentenced to death.57 
Inequity persists for both crime victim and offender. According to historians, 
“at no time has the majority of the U.S. adult population or households 
managed to gain title to any more than about 10% of the nation’s wealth.”58 
In 2001, the bottom half of American households reportedly owned only 
2.8% of the nation’s wealth and 0.5% of stock investments.59 
When the first federal crime victims’ rights legislation was presented 
with the support of President Reagan’s Task Force on Victims of Crime in 
1982,60 crime victims came forward to testify to their mistreatment by the 
justice system and their relative disadvantage. Select witnesses decried 
paying for the “staggering expenses” of the funerals of their murdered 
children, while the convicted defendants were incarcerated, “getting all the 
help they need” in the form of food, housing, clothing, education, and 
medical and psychological care.61 At this time, the United States Supreme 
Court in Rhodes v. Chapman, held that prison overcrowding did not violate 
the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause if there was 
no actual injury from deprivation of essential food, medical care, sanitation, 
 
57 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 251–52 (1972) (internal footnote and 
citation omitted). 
58 REIMAN, supra note 7, at 189 (citing Carol Shammas, 98 AM. HIST. REV. 189 
(1993)). 
59 Id.  
60 ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., SECURING RIGHTS FOR VICTIMS: A PROCESS 
EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIM LAW INSTITUTE’S VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 
CLINICS 9 (2009). 
61 Judge Lois Haight Interview Transcript, AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CRIME 
VICTIM ASSISTANCE FIELD VIDEO AND AUDIO ARCHIVE, UNIV. OF AKRON (Feb. 24, 
2003), http://vroh.uakron.edu/transcripts/Haight.php (a former prosecutor in 
Oakland, California).  
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or increased violence.62 Moreover, the Court held that lack of rehabilitation 
is not inherently violative: 
Although job and educational opportunities diminished 
marginally as a result of double celling, limited work hours 
and delay before receiving education do not inflict pain, 
much less unnecessary and wanton pain; deprivations of this 
kind simply are not punishments. We would have to wrench 
the Eighth Amendment from its language and history to hold 
that delay of these desirable aids to rehabilitation violates the 
Constitution.63 
Prosecutors and victim advocates shared how the justice officials 
generally blamed victims for the inability to hold offenders “accountable” 
when victims were reluctant to report crime or cooperate with the system.64 
Victims were seen as “just one more piece of evidence,” and if they failed to 
appear, they could be jailed for contempt.65 Judges failed to protect victim 
privacy, routinely sharing their contact information with offenders in 
discovery, and failed to ensure that victims received the return of their 
property kept in evidence.66 In the early 1980s, victims in the vast majority 
of states were not permitted to provide a victim impact statement at trial or 
at parole hearings, and they were not informed when offenders obtained early 
release.67  
By the early 1990s, every state provided a victim compensation fund 
for victims of violent crime and the right to be “informed, present, and 
heard.”68 By 2005, the voters of 32 states had amended their constitutions to 
include crime victim rights, and all 50 states had protective legislation.69 In 
2018, gains had slowed to where 35 states had constitutional provisions, with 
six more states considering adoption of specific constitutional crime victim 
 
62 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981). 
63 Id. 
64 Judge Lois Haight Interview Transcript, supra note 61.  
65 Marlene A. Young Interview Transcript, AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CRIME 
VICTIM ASSISTANCE FIELD VIDEO AND AUDIO ARCHIVE, UNIV. OF AKRON (Feb. 24, 
2003),  http://vroh.uakron.edu/transcripts/Young.php. 
66 Judge Lois Haight Interview Transcript, supra note 61. 
67 Id.  
68 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 60, at 11. 
69 Sarah Brown Hammond, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Enforcing 
and Evaluating Victims’ Rights Laws, 13 LEGISBRIEF 1 (March 2005), 
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/pubs/lbriefs/05LBMar_VictimsRights.p
df.  
2021] The Revelatory Nature of COVID-19  215 
rights.70 In this twenty year period, crime victim rights sought a tenuous 
partnership with the State. However, when federal grant funding for crime 
victim rights was first provided, crime victim advocates from nonprofit crisis 
centers, who were doing most of the work, did not receive the same level of 
funds as prosecutors and other state officials who “gobbled it up” with more 
professional grant applications, creating, for example, internal victim witness 
assistant programs.71 When prosecutors were tasked with ensuring that 
victims were given the opportunity to exercise their rights, they often lacked 
training,72 and law schools still rarely include crime victim rights education 
in the curricula despite their constitutional status. State actors appear to have 
been indifferent to the importance of the crime victim voice as a key to 
justice, perhaps fearing that the victim would “distort the delicate balance of 
[justice]” in a system “not designed for the remedy of private interests.”73 
Some argued that lifting up the status of crime victims would interfere with 
the role of the prosecutor to ensure not only justice for the victim, but for the 
public as well.74 However, with respect to promoting the goals of the justice 
system, Judge Haight, one of the first prosecutors to work with new victim 
rights legislation in California, stated the problem succinctly:  
If we treat victims poorly, if we don’t treat them well, they 
will not cooperate with the criminal justice system and they 
will not report crime or if they do report it, they won’t testify 
and then the criminal is free to prey on more and more 
victims. There is no accountability.75 
To accompany an array of federal crime victim rights legislation in 
the 1980s and 1990s,76 crime victim rights clinics were developed to 
 
70 Anne Teigen, Rights for Crime Victims on the Ballot in Six States, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES: THE NCSL BLOG (Oct. 12, 2018), 
https://www.ncsl.org/blog/2018/10/12/rights-for-crime-victims-on-the-ballot-in-
six-states.aspx. 
71 Judge Lois Haight Interview Transcript, supra note 61. 
72 Id.  
73 Alan N. Young, Two Scales of Justice: A Reply, 35 CRIM. L.Q. 355, 358 
(1993). 
74 See Lawrence Schlam, Enforcing Victim’s Rights in Illinois: The Rationale 
for Victim “Standing” in Criminal Prosecutions, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 597, 602-03 
(2015) (quoting concerns by the judiciary of “a dangerous return to the private blood 
feud mentality”).  
75 Judge Lois Haight Interview Transcript, supra note 61. 
76 See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 60, at 9–10 (discussing the legislative 
chronology, including the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-
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empower a cadre of attorneys to represent crime victims in court and ensure 
that their rights were enforced.77 For example, crime victim attorneys could 
seek orders of protection for privacy and safety, move to amend a plea to 
include restitution, or file a writ with the court to allow the victim to be 
present in the courtroom.78 Victims needed legal standing to enforce these 
rights, which was not often provided, and remedies for violations of crime 
victim rights were also absent.79 Standing elevated the status of crime victim 
rights in the few states that permitted crime victims to be personally 
represented in criminal court,80 with renewed efforts to amend constitutions 
to grant such standing.81 During the pandemic, for example, the Supreme 
Court of Arizona held in E.H. v. Slayton, that the Arizona Constitution gave 
a crime victim the right to have an attorney at bar, as well as the statutory 
right to “full” restitution, with no cap imposed at the plea hearing without 
victim consent.82 Moreover, the Court held that “[a]t all times, . . . a trial 
court's discretion to address seating arrangements [during the pandemic] 
 
291 (authorizing victim restitution and victim impact statements); Victims of Crime 
Act (VOCA) of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473 (providing victim compensation funding at the 
state and local level); Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 
10607 et seq., Pub. L. 101-647 (authorizing victim notification of criminal processes 
in federal court, the right to attendance, notice of defendant’s release, right to inform 
the prosecution on pleas and sentencing, and protection from aggressive acts by the 
defendant); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-
322 (providing for a right for the victim to speak at sentencing, mandating restitution 
in sex offense cases, and increasing funding for local victim services); Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132; Victim Rights 
Clarification Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-6; and Crime Victim Rights Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. 108-405 (incorporated as part of the Justice for All Act of 2004)). 
77 See generally DAVIS ET al. supra note 60. (a monograph for the RAND 
Corporation). But see Paul G. Cassell & Margaret Garvin, Protecting Crime Victims 
in State Constitutions: The Example of the New Marsy’s Law for Florida, 110 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99, 136–137 (2020) (explaining that many crime victims 
must assert their rights without the aid of counsel). 
78 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 60, at xiv. 
79 Id. at 12-13, Hammond, supra note 69.  
80 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 60, at 10, 13 (identifying states with express 
provisions granting legal standing to assert crime victim rights to include Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. § 13-4437, Fla. Stat. § 960.001; Ind. Code § 35-40-2-1, and Tex. Const. Art. I, 
§ 30). 
81 See generally Paul G. Cassell & Margaret Garvin, Protecting Crime Victims 
in State Constitutions: The Example of the New Marsy’s Law for Florida, 110 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99 (2020). 
82 E.H. v. Slayton, 468 P.3d 1209 (2020).  
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must honor a victim's constitutional right to be present and heard at criminal 
proceedings and to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect.”83  
However, victims’ rights could not generally impinge on the 
defendant’s constitutional rights, such as interference with an agreed upon 
plea.84 Victim impact statements often have been limited to testimony 
regarding the impact of the crime alone, whether a victim seeks vengeance 
or mercy and a compassionate sentence.85 In State v. Glassell, the Arizona 
Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in a capital case when it 
failed to permit a victim witness to testify at the penalty phase in favor of a 
life sentence, for the Eighth Amendment bars a victim from making a 
sentencing recommendation.86 Despite the defendant’s argument that the 
Eighth Amendment should only prevent victims from advocating for a death 
sentence, not from advocating for leniency, the court held that the only 
relevance of a victim impact statement is “evidence of the impact of the 
crime.”87 
As to offering substantive evidence, many evidentiary and witness 
accommodations have been recognized since the 1980s, taking into account 
trauma caused to victims from the criminal act and the trial process itself.88 
And yet, a focus on the victim’s mental health, a source of advocacy for 
restitution for the cost of counseling, became a basis for defense strategies to 
diminish the credibility of crime victims.89 As an example, in a child physical 
abuse prosecution involving burns to a child with autism spectrum disorder, 
the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to establish a compelling need to 
order an independent psychological examination of the child to challenge the 
 
83 Id. at 1217. 
84 E.g,, State v. Means, 926 A.2d 328 (N.J. 2007). 
85 See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 60, at 61. 
86 State v. Glassel, 116 P.3d 1193, 1215 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1024 
(2006). 
87 Id.  
88 E.g., Walker v. State, 461 S.W.3d 599 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that 
when a child victim of sexual abuse testifies by closed circuit television to reduce 
trauma it does not violate the defendant’s right to confrontation). 
89 See, e.g., In re Michael H., 602 S.E.2d 729 (S.C. 2004) (upholding, as a matter 
of first impression, a trial court’s order at the defendant’s request for an independent 
psychological evaluation of a child sexual abuse victim witness). But see State v. 
Horn, 446 S.E.2d 52 (N.C. 1994) (concluding that “the possible benefits to an 
innocent defendant, flowing from such a court ordered examination of the witness, 
are outweighed by the resulting invasion of the witness' right to privacy and the 
danger to the public interest from discouraging victims of crime to report such 
offenses.”). 
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child’s competency to testify.90 The factors included consideration of the 
probative value of the evidence, but also “the resulting physical and/or 
emotional effects of the examination of the victim.”91  
While one might argue that “[i]deal victims are those who it is 
believed would find it difficult or even impossible to protect themselves from 
criminal offenders,”92 such preferred status is not offered to the many persons 
in the United States suffering from addiction or mental illness who have been 
both crime victim and offender. Also, most victims and offenders of violent 
crime know each other as members of the same household or community.93 
Stigma against certain crime victims reflects the existing prejudices in 
society, likely influencing which victims have been more “heard” by 
prosecuting attorneys and the courts. The perspectives of victims who 
themselves have a criminal record or were engaged in criminal conduct at the 
time of the offense may not be as valued by a court obliged to sentence the 
defendant for similar conduct.94 Victims of crime who are perceived as 
morally suspect, such as those who have contracted a sexually transmitted 
disease, or exhibit aberrant behavior not identified as a mental illness, or who 
live a life on the margins of society, may not be granted equal respect by the 
criminal justice system.95 In a review of litigation involving either HIV-
positive defendants or victims, one researcher has suggested that 
“circumstances involving HIV-positive lives or homosexuality challenge 
decision-makers’ sense of familiarity and comfort” with race, gender 
identity, and sexual orientation.96 Demonstrating a punitive approach to 
social stigma, more than thirty states have enacted criminal felony offenses 
for intentional transmission of an infectious disease, including HIV/AIDS.97 
 
90 State v. Johnson, No. 2017-000873, 2019 WL 7369266 (S.C. Ct. App. Dec. 
31, 2019). 
91 Id. at *2. 
92 KENNEDY & SACCO, supra note 6, at 12. 
93 Id. at 14. 
94 See generally Joshua Kleinfeld, A Theory of Criminal Victimization, 65 STAN. 
L. REV. 1087 (2013) (examining the moral and theoretical justifications for 
differential legal treatment of different types of victims, such as children or persons 
with disabilities). 
95 Ben Myers & Edith Greene, The Prejudicial Nature of Victim Impact 
Statements, 10 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 492 (2004) (finding that juries in capital 
cases are more emotionally swayed by certain kinds of victim impact statements). 
96 Carrie Griffin Basas, The Sentence of HIV, 101 KY. L.J. 543, 591–92, 599–
600 (2012-2013). 
97 Mark E. Wojcik & David W. Austin, Criminal Justice and COVID-19, 35 
CRIM. JUST. 44, 45 (2020). 
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 State actors and politicians manipulate what has been termed by 
Professor Melissa Cole as a “hierarchy of disability,” where the statutory 
framework identifying the need for legal protection excludes some 
conditions more than others.98 Wrapped up in the definitions of disability are 
notions of self-control and agency. In other words, if one can alleviate a 
disability one should do so, such as taking medication for mental illness or 
wearing corrective lenses or accepting a cochlear implant. Thus, the 
individual “chooses”, with society’s approval, to no longer be disabled.99 In 
the criminal justice system, this is apparent where some victims, such as 
children and older adults, are granted higher status through enhanced 
sentences and specific offenses to protect them as special victims,100 
compared to those victims who are vulnerable based on class, race, or lack 
of access to health care who receive no such protection. The latter are, in 
essence, to be blamed for their victimization, despite the fact that victims 
with mental illness experience significantly higher rates of crime 
victimization than those without disabilities.101 Due to their relative lack of 
access to law enforcement and reduced ability to detect and protect 
themselves from offending behavior, victims facing an intersection of race, 
class, and mental illness are at higher risk of becoming both a victim of crime 
and targeted as an offender by the state.102 
Victims’ rights are not duties and victims’ optional exercise of their 
rights is inherently diverse. What crime victims want from the justice system 
may vary from regaining control, being heard, obtaining compassion, seeking 
vindication, and ensuring rehabilitation of offenders, but it also allows for 
forgiveness as an element of healing for the victim.103 Anecdotal reports in 
legal news have stated that “[s]ome crime victims and their families 
 
98 See Melissa Cole, The Mitigation Expectation and the Sutton Court’s 
Closeting of Disabilities, 43 HOW. L.J. 499, 528 (2000). 
99 Id. at 527–28. 
100 E.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 565.002 (2020) (providing sentencing enhancements 
for assaults against certain special victims, such as law enforcement officers, persons 
with a disability, elderly persons, employees of mass transit systems, and corrections 
officers in the performance of their duties).  
101 Office for Victims of Crime, First Response to Victims of Crime Who Have 
a Disability, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE 1 (Oct. 2002) (addressing additional legal 
protections and required accommodations for victims of crime with disabilities under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973). 
102 Id. 
103 ELIAS, supra note 9, at 95. 
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expressed anger upon learning that inmates were released from prison 
because of COVID-19.”104 On the other hand, this may merely reflect the 
bias of reporters to reinforce the stereotype that victims of crime only seek 
punishment at all costs. Anecdotal reports of crime victims advocating for 
compassionate release, or declining to oppose it, would not make news, and 
yet crime victims have done so throughout the pandemic.105 For certain types 
of offenses, however, such as family violence, the risk of release to the victim 
and the public may be quite serious. According to the National Bulletin on 
Domestic Violence Prevention, the United Nations estimated that six months 
of lockdown worldwide could lead to 31 million additional domestic violence 
cases.106 Arguably, giving crime victims the power to accept or decline the 
right to provide a victim impact statement or to seek restitution is beneficial 
in itself for one disempowered by the criminal act and historically 
disrespected by the justice system. 
C. The Typical Prisoner is Neuroatypical  
Just as many victims of crime experience trauma, most criminal 
offenders experience significant trauma both before and during incarceration, 
and after release.107 It is well established that more persons with mental 
illness are incarcerated than are in mental health facilities in the United 
States.108 Some would argue that addressing the mental health needs of those 
in prison “is nearly impossible” due to the paucity of resources, staff, and 
funding.109 Supermax prisons with extreme isolation became misused for 
housing the overflow of mentally ill and ungovernable prisoners, which led 
to extreme psychological damage, including “states of psychosis, depression, 
 
104 Wojcik, supra note 97, at 48. 
105 See infra Part IV. 
106 DV in the News: DV and COVID-19, 26 NAT’L BULL. ON DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE PREV. (June 2020) (including data from Johns Hopkins University). 
107 See Curtis Davis & Samantha Francois, Behind Closed Doors: Considering 
a Triphasic Traumatic Incarceration Experience, 26 TRAUMATOLOGY 193 (2020). 
108 See E. Fuller Torrey et al., U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., 
NCJ No. 230531, MORE MENTALLY ILL PERSONS ARE IN JAIL AND PRISONS THAN 
HOSPITALS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR. (May 2010), 
https://www.ojp.gov/library/abstracts/more-mentally-ill-persons-are-jails-and-
prisons-hospitals-survey-states; see also Dominic A. Sisti et al., Improving Long-
term Psychiatric Care: Bring Back the Asylum, 313 JAMA NETWORK 243, 243 
(2015) (stating that in-patient psychiatric beds have declined by 95% in the last half 
century).  
109 AHN-REDDING, supra note 12, at 62. 
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anxiety, and confusion.”110 In a 2002 prison study, inmates over age 65 
accounted for over 30% of prison medical costs, including treatment for age-
related mental health disorders.111  
Congress also recently recognized the inordinate number of 
prisoners with mental illness, who in previous generations may have been 
directed to treatment facilities rather than incarceration:  
[T]he high incidence of offenders with mental illness in jail 
is simply the lack of mental health treatment, particularly for 
non-violent offenders. Once incarcerated, people with 
mental illness have difficulty obtaining adequate treatment. 
They are at high risk of suicide, and they may be preyed 
upon by other inmates.112 
In its best light, the severity of mass incarceration in large part reflects a 
crime control policy premised on the philosophy of deterrence, and yet 
researchers have not supported a deterrent effect on crime for the individual 
or society due the criminogenic effect of incarceration.113 What came out of 
the War on Drugs was not only mass incarceration, but increasing 
opportunities for invasive surveillance and militarized approaches against 
what the state portrayed as deviant communities.114 As reported violent crime 
 
110 Id. at 60; see also Kirsten Weir, Alone, in ‘the Hole’, Psychologists Probe the 
Mental Health Effects of Solitary Confinement, 43 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 54 (May 
2012), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2012/05/solitary (identifying risks of solitary 
confinement in supermax prisons to include “anxiety, panic, insomnia, paranoia, 
aggression and depression). 
111 AHN-REDDING, supra note 12, at 104.  
112 Criminal Justice Responses to Offenders with Mental Illness: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong., 1 (2007) (statement of Robert Scott, Chair, House of Rep. Committee of the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security). 
113 CASSIA SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE? THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND 
JUSTICE IN PUNISHMENT 291–93 (SAGE, 2d ed., 2009) (finding that incarceration 
doubles the rate of recidivism of drug offenders compared to probation). 
114 Eliav Lieblich & Adam Shinar, The Case Against Police Militarization, 23 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 105, 134 (2017-2018) (connecting racial profiling to militarized 
approaches to civil unrest); REIMAN, supra note 7, at 48 (identifying the state’s 
interest in normalizing perpetual surveillance with a panopticon effect); Paul 
Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1422 (1993) (presenting numerous reports of racist and 
“groundless searches” of minorities during drug investigations, resulting in vastly 
disproportionate numbers of arrests of black and Hispanic men for drug offenses); 
ELIAS, supra note 9, at 67. 
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declined over the decades115 and the focus on violent crime victims took the 
lead in the crime victim rights movement, “victimless” drug offenses became 
the object of policies enabling mass incarceration.  
Victims who wanted leniency in sentencing a criminal case were not 
necessarily those who sought services from the crime victim rights 
movement. Victim witness assistants, working for the state prosecutors’ 
offices, naturally promoted the objectives of the state, but could not easily 
manage dual loyalties should a victim openly disagree with a prosecutor, 
while still seeking support from the prosecutor’s office. The nonprofit crisis 
center victim advocates, more independent from the state, although often 
reliant on grant funding from the state,116 often worked with the most 
egregious cases of violence, thus likely influencing their fears that offenders 
presented a continual risk and deserved severe sanctions. Statewide victim 
advocacy nonprofits that provide training to crisis advocates, prosecutorial 
staff, police officers, and even judges, have consistently lobbied for greater 
criminal sanctions against offenders.  
While these factors all facilitate the crime victim rights movement’s 
support of state control, it does not necessarily reflect the perspective of most 
crime victims, who directly experience the impact of the criminal justice 
system, mass incarceration and the tearing of social fabrics where both victim 
and offender lived.  Most crime victims who are victims of less violent crimes 
are not sincerely asked to exercise their rights in the justice system. Also, 
many crime victims who are actively involved in the sentencing process are 
not asked to consider justice, but are only asked to explain the impact on their 
own life, ultimately to be measured by the system itself.117 If the typical 
prisoner is neuroatypical, and both victims and offenders face similar societal 
barriers, together they could present a vision of reform for the criminal justice 
system that respects the needs of the communities most harmed. Whether 
such an approach would comport with the goals and interests of the criminal 
justice system warrants examination.  
 
115 See John Gramlich, What the Data Says (and Doesn’t Say) About Crime in 
the United States, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 20, 2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/20/facts-about-crime-in-the-u-s/ 
(explaining that while most Americans believe crime is on the rise, in fact, the violent 
crime rate fell by 49% between 1993 and 2019). 
116 See supra note 26. 
117 See supra notes 75–78. 
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III. THE BENEFITS OF RETRIBUTION, DETERRENCE, AND RESPECT 
FOR AUTONOMY 
The criminal justice system, when dehumanizing offenders and 
crime victims, amplifies the interests of the state over the individual. Even 
efforts at rehabilitation as a more humane cure for crime than punishment 
can disguise an interest in enhancing state control in society. Importantly, 
mental health researchers evaluating the criminal justice system have 
highlighted the risk that applying psychological labels to offenders is 
paternalistic and could diminish the legal autonomy of the offender.118 Given 
court-ordered indeterminate treatment, such as involuntary commitment of 
sex offenders, “the use of psychiatry in the legal system seems to provide 
support for increased social control of felony defendants,” which shifts the 
focus from punishment to the “management of aggregates of dangerous 
groups.”119 Existing biases are infused in new justice approaches when 
discretion is exercised by the same state actors. Research has found that 
aggressive women prisoners, for example, are more likely to be provided 
with a mental health placement, while aggressive men are more likely to be 
placed in solitary confinement.120 
 What is absent in traditional theoretical approaches to sentencing is 
direct consideration of the role of the crime victim in the criminal justice 
system.121 The case law addressing victim impact statements reveals diversity 
of viewpoint among victims of crime as to the appropriateness of 
punishment.122 Given the recency of crime victim rights in the United States, 
and lack of standing to assert them, it is not surprising if victim involvement 
is sporadic. The few research studies directly addressing what victims usually 
seek from sentencing hearings are limited.123  
Enhancing the crime victim’s role at sentencing has potential to 
improve the effectiveness and fairness of the system. And yet, the risks are 
 
118 THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 178. 
119 Id. at 184. 
120 Id. at 27. 
121 KENNEDY & SACCO, supra note 6, at 93 (“The history of theoretical attempts 
to explain crime can largely be read as a history of the neglect of the role and 
significance of crime victims.”). 
122 See infra Part IV. 
123 E.g., Uli Orth, Punishment Goals of Crime Victims, 27 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 
173 (2003) (studying victims of sexual assault and non-sexual assault and finding 
that victims prioritized the goals of deterrence of the offender, victim security, and 
societal security, followed by general deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation least 
of all). 
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cyclical if public policy fails. In one view, “[c]rime must be adequately 
punished by the state; if the prison is not sufficiently punitive, a system of 
private revenge will arise to supplement it.”124 This assumes that victims and 
society require punishment. A rehabilitative alternative could be oppressive, 
anesthetizing offenders and rendering them incapacitated against their will. 
The latter would offend American notions of autonomy, and, without 
economic and racial justice reform, would yet again disproportionately 
disadvantage the low-income, purportedly “deviant” classes. Prison should 
never have been the primary treatment facility for Americans. Offender 
programs, alternate sentencing, and other efforts at individual reform will 
have little impact, anyway, until the United States better addresses income 
inequality and equal opportunity.125 If policymakers cannot see this, perhaps 
a stronger, combined voice of offender and victim will right the imbalance 
and reestablish proportionality, dignity and respect for the individuals in the 
justice system. 
A. Theoretical Approaches to Sentencing 
In matters of criminal justice reform, sentencing policy must be 
informed by its goals. Historically, and at present, these could very generally 
be summarized to include the goals of rehabilitation, including education, 
medication, involuntary commitment, restorative justice, and therapeutic 
jurisprudence; specific and general deterrence, including tailored specialty 
courts, incarceration, electronic monitoring and other forms of community 
supervision; and retribution.126 Disparate forms of sentencing such as orders 
of restitution, hard labor, and prisons requiring solitary confinement could all 
be argued to serve the three goals listed in some way. 
 The call for retribution strikes a chord in most people, as it is meted 
out in quotidian human interactions where one might feel another deserves 
to be punished, regardless of the outcome. As a matter of state condemnation, 
retribution performs an expressive role, avoiding the appearance that the 
 
124 HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 293 (1988). 
125 See SHELDEN, supra note 11, at 323. 
126 See generally Beware of Punishment: On the Utility and Futility of Criminal 
Law, in 14 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY (Annika Snare ed., 1995); 
EDMOND CAHN , CONFRONTING INJUSTICE, THE EDMOND CAHN READER (Lenore L. 
Cahn ed., 1966); Dena M. Gromet & John M. Darley, Punishment and Beyond: 
Achieving Justice Through the Satisfaction of Multiple Goals, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1 
(2009); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of 
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659 (1992). 
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State is complicit in the misconduct.127 However, according to Protagoras, 
one should seek a more rational approach to punish in order to deter future 
harm, and thus avoid the animal instincts of vengeance.128 Plato’s theory of 
punishment would reform the “curable criminals,” seek to obtain forgiveness 
from victims, and incapacitate the “incurables” in order to deter others.129 
Personal responsibility is favored over pity for the offender or victim, where 
Plato finds utility to be derived only from punishment upon the “satisfaction 
of the grievance of the victim” who will benefit “simply by witnessing the 
wretchedness of the man who originally made him suffer.”130 Philosophy 
scholar Mary Margaret Mackenzie identifies correlates between Greek and 
modern cultural attachments to the impulse toward retributivism.131 Such an 
impulse reinforces concepts of culpability, freedom, and self-determination 
to reassure humans that they are not merely creatures of circumstance.132 
Offering an offender an opportunity to redress harms and pay for his or her 
wrongdoing is more respectful of human autonomy than assuming the 
offender is incapable of choosing whether or not to commit a crime. 
However, proportionality in sentencing remains a foundational concept for 
retribution, proportional in the sense that the punishment fits the crime and 
that individual offenders are treated fairly with respect to each other.  
Jeremy Bentham, the English philosopher, jurist, and social reformer 
regarded as the founder of modern utilitarianism, put forth the principle that 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the measure of right and 
wrong.133 Here the utilitarian would welcome the offender’s suffering if it 
deterred future misconduct, but not as a form of retributivist justice or just 
deserts.134 As a paternalistic approach, it would impute consent to 
punishment and forced rehabilitation on the part of the offender as a member 
of society and disregard any “encroachment upon the autonomy of the 
individual.”135 Influencing early American sentencing theory, utilitarianism 
asserted that proportionality in punishment would be required to avoid 
greater harm and to promote general deterrence, but individual victim 
 
127 MARY MARGARET MACKENZIE, PLATO ON PUNISHMENT 25 (1981). 
128 PAMELA HUBY, PLATO AND MODERN MORALITY 72 (1972) (noting that 
Protagoras is a pre-Socratic philosopher who died in 411 B.C.E.). 
129 MACKENZIE, supra note 127, at 227–28. 
130 Id. at 229. 
131 Id. at 237. 
132 Id. at 238. 
133 See id. at 35.  
134 Id. at 39. 
135 MACKENZIE supra note 127, at 57. 
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impacts and restitution would not further the wider utilitarian goal.136 Today, 
victim advocates would suggest that victim impact statements supply critical 
information to the judiciary in determining the extent of the harm caused and 
thus benefit the determination of a proportional sentence.137 
In the modern era, the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth 
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is measured, not by 
“historical conceptions,” but by the “evolving standards of a mature society,” 
which “[do] not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.”138 And 
yet, “[r]etribution is a legitimate means to punish,” in order to “express 
[societal] condemnation of the crime and to seek restoration of the moral 
imbalance caused by the offense.” 139 However, the Court has reasoned that 
“[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be 
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.”140 
Bentham and other philosophers, for various reasons, would consider 
punishment of infants or the insane to lack utilitarian value, proportionality, 
and any possibility of specific deterrence or retributive value.141  
 To determine a just and proportionate sentence, predominating 
factors also evolve over time and vary by jurisdiction, undermining what 
Immanuel Kant would have espoused as essential consistency to elevate 
retribution over “mere private judgment.”142 Crime victims and advocates 
would easily note that individual jurists cannot escape their own private 
judgments and cultural familiarity.143 In People v. Rhoades, the Illinois Court 
of Appeals stated that it need not compare its standards with that of other 
 
136 Id. at 37–38. 
137 See generally Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611 (2009).  
138 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58, 71 (2010). 
139 Id. at 71. 
140 Id.  
141 See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Inefficacious Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 186, 186 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972); Thomas 
Hobbes, Of Punishments and Rewards in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
PUNISHMENT 3, 3-4 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972) (asserting that the right to punish 
inheres from an ability to consent to society’s right to punish); J.E. McTaggart, 
Hegel’s Theory of Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 
40, 40–41 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972) (promoting the offender as a moral being 
with capacity for repentance). 
142 Immanuel Kant, Justice and Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON PUNISHMENT 103, 104 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972). 
143 See Joe D. Whitley et al., A Prisoner’s Dilemma: COVID-19 and Motions for 
Compassionate Release, PRACT. INSIGHTS COMMENT. (May 28, 2020) (describing 
the randomness of judicial rulings from a legal practitioner’s perspective). 
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states.144 The Illinois Constitution article I, section 11 requires considering 
the seriousness of the offense and restoring useful citizenship to the 
defendant, but the court held in Rhoades that it would primarily protect 
vulnerable members of society, specifically children, from sexual abuse in 
imposing a life sentence.145 The goals of protective restraint and specific 
deterrence seem to predominate over goals of rehabilitation or retribution in 
this determination.  
Nevertheless, retribution alone has value for crime victims of 
violence and their families, who themselves may never fully recover from 
the impact of the criminal act. There is also a purpose to collective suffering 
evident in the creation of the modern crime victims’ rights movement, as well 
as other humanitarian and civil justice reform efforts. They hearken back to 
the publicly performed Greek tragedies, provoking fear and pity for manifest 
unfairness, emotions bringing comfort when felt together by many.146 
However true this remains today, many victims and offenders do pursue the 
end of suffering for themselves and others, but find revelation and self-
awareness through suffering as well. Modern sentencing alternatives, such as 
restorative justice embrace this concept. 
Restorative and community justice approaches also call for greater 
victim and community input in sentencing, although they were initially only 
acceptable for the category of low-level nonviolent offenses which did not 
pose a physical threat to victims.147 Their efficacy is unproven but promising. 
For example, some studies have indicated that the impact of victim 
statements in court-ordered proceedings does not tend to generate feelings of 
empathy or remorse among homicide offenders at the sentencing hearing, 
and that victims may not care or expect to receive an apology from the 
offender.148 Additionally, specific deterrence and rehabilitation programs 
may be less effective with some neuroatypical offenders. Some offenders 
with mental health diagnoses demonstrate difficulty in finding empathy, and 
 
144 People v. Rhoades, 115 N.E.3d 1238, 1243 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). 
145 Id. at 1243–44. 
146 MACKENZIE, supra note 127, at 101, 112 (explaining that Greek tragedies 
portrayed that “life is neither fair, kind, nor ordered” to remind the public that they 
at least suffer injustice together). 
147 See AHN-REDDING, supra note 12, at 195–96; Michael Wenzel et al., 
Retributive and Restorative Justice, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 375 (2008). 
148 See Tracey Booth, Victim Impact Statements and the Nature and Incidence 
of Offender Remorse: Findings from an Observation Study in Superior Sentencing 
Court, 22 GRIFFITH L. REV. 430, 433 (2013) (noting that out of court voluntary 
restorative justice proceedings may have more positive impact). 
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they may not respond as expected by the court or victim.149 As shown below, 
a broader role for crime victim and community in sentencing could assist the 
court in determining whether incarceration is appropriate for offenders with 
mental health disorders.  
B. Mental Health Research and the Meaning of Justice  
In general, crime victims remain interested in retribution and 
deterrence as goals to ensure justice, including those victims who are also 
offenders. In one study, for example, offenders who have been raped in 
prison asserted that they perceive justice to require punishment of the 
perpetrator, and would not be satisfied with the mere opportunity to file a 
civil claim 150 Yet empirical research has also demonstrated that offenders 
subject to life in prison express distress over the denial of an opportunity for 
redemption, which they feel cannot occur within the prison setting.151 Over 
time, the criminal justice system and reform advocates have responded to 
criticism of punitive approaches by claiming to engage in rehabilitative 
measures that arguably deter crime and protect community safety.152 In the 
context of some of its most stringent new measures, the criminal justice 
system has adopted criminal registry requirements, indefinite involuntary 
commitment of sex offenders, and other purportedly rehabilitative 
programming, which the courts have deemed to be civil, not punitive, actions, 
and therefore beyond the scope of constitutional protections for criminal 
defendants.153 This approach is painted as humane and in the best interests of 
 
149 See Francesco Margoni & Luca Surian, Mental State Understanding and 
Moral Judgment in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder, 7 FRONT PSYCHOL. 
1478 (2016) (recommending treatment to develop empathy, as “ASD [autism 
spectrum disorder] individuals show the ability to produce a basic moral judgment 
by relying on external cues such as the action outcomes and the victims' emotional 
reactions”); Alan M. Leslie et al., Transgressors, Victims, and Cry Babies: Is Basic 
Moral Judgment Spared in Autism?, 1 SOC. NEUROSCIENCE 270 (2006). 
150 See Sheryl P. Kubiak et al., Do Sexually Victimized Female Prisoners 
Perceive Justice in Litigation Process and Outcomes?, 23 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & 
L. 39 (2016). 
151 See Adelina Iftene, The Bad, the Ugly, and the Horrible: What I Learned 
About Humanity by Doing Prison Research, 43 DALHOUSIE L.J. 435, 443 (2020). 
152 See, e.g., Andrea Craig Armstrong, The Missing Link: Jail and Prison 
Conditions in Criminal Justice Reform, 80 LA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2019). 
153 See, e.g., Williams v. Annucci, 189 A.D. 3d 1839, at *2 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2020) (holding that the sex offender management program is part of a remedial 
statute “intended to prevent future crime, rather than a penal statute imposing 
punishment for a past crime”).  
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offenders, but risks the exercise of a different kind of state control over 
marginalized communities.154  
For example, in 2020 the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, of the 
State of New York determined that the state Department of Corrections and 
Community Supervision had the statutory right to impose an additional 
lengthier term of sex offender treatment programming against the inmate’s 
wishes.155 The court acknowledged its traditional deference “to the discretion 
of correction officials on matters relating to the administration of prison 
facilities and rehabilitation programs.”156 
In Wisconsin, the involuntary commitment of prisoners with 
psychosis and delusions, including forced administration of psychotropic 
medications, may be authorized by prison authorities even without a finding 
of dangerousness.157 Unlike the general population where a finding of 
dangerousness would be required for commitment, for prisoners the court 
applied the state’s statutory commitment scheme in which the inmate “can 
receive treatment for his or her mental illness” when the prison system cannot 
adequately provide it.158  
Public health advocates often see their role as one of a beneficent 
power and service to society, with secondary attention paid to the autonomy 
of the individual. As Lawrence Gostin wrote:  
[P]roperly conceived correctional facilities could present a 
public health opportunity. Prior to incarceration, many 
inmates are in poor health, and many have communicable 
diseases, which are difficult to identify and treat among the 
poor, the homeless, and the disenfranchised. Society is ill-
served by policies that fail to deal with, and even exacerbate, 
inmates’ diseases during confinement . . .. Therefore, it is far 
more cost effective and beneficial to inmates, their families, 
 
154 See generally Jennifer A. Brobst, Miranda in Mental Health: Court Ordered 
Confessions and Therapeutic Injustice for Young Offenders, 40 NOVA L. REV. 387 
(2016) (addressing the legal risks of court-ordered mental health treatment of 
juvenile sex offenders who are forced to disclose additional crimes). 
155 Id.  
156 Williams v. Annucci, 189 A.D. 3d 1839, at *2 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020). 
157 In re Mental Commitment of Christopher S., 878 N.W. 2d 109 (2016) 
(addressing a state correctional inmate diagnosed with schizophrenia paranoid type). 
158 Id. at 119. 
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and to society to use the period of confinement to reach this 
otherwise elusive group.159 
However, individual autonomy is critical. Not all treatment options are 
efficacious or well tested, such as physical and chemical restraints for mental 
illness, which may have serious side effects.160 The marginalized 
communities Gostin writes of are marginalized further if the criminal justice 
system imposes a coercive, medicalized regime. Public health scholar Scott 
Burris argues more clearly for patient autonomy and mutual respect in the 
prison setting, contending that “controlling TB is every bit as dependent on 
cooperation between health workers and patients as controlling HIV.”161 
Even Sweden, a nation known for excellence in providing a social safety net, 
has experienced growing criticism of its welfare state for creating too much 
social control, learned helplessness, boredom, and crime, with criminologists 
seeing calls for punishment of crime, rather than treatment.162 
 Self-determination lies at the core of freedom, a fact which the 
dissenting justices in Kahler v. Kansas recognized in the context of criminal 
culpability, recalling early texts which set the test for insanity upon a showing 
of a mental disorder which “takes away from the party all moral agency and 
accountability.”163 Although reform of the insanity defense is beyond the 
scope of this article, the decision does require reflection on the value in 
respecting the autonomy of criminal defendants, including those with mental 
illness and intellectual disabilities. Punishment should be a means to some 
good, whether making amends, counseling against future harm, or restraint 
for public safety; and, from a theological perspective, St. Thomas Aquinas 
would argue that evil must be overcome by good, promoting “charity 
 
159 Lawrence O. Gostin, The Resurgent Tuberculosis Epidemic in the Era of 
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160 See Lamiece Hassan et al., Prevalence and Appropriateness of Psychotropic 
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whereby we are bound to love all men.”164 Sentencing should also be cautious 
and critical in determining whether psychological measures and assessments 
are not misused in sentencing. For example, neuroimaging results related to 
psychopathy have evinced racial bias resulting in higher sentencing.165 
 One benefit is that mental health research promotes the value of 
censure to ultimately increase a sense of well-being in the individual who is 
censured. Communicative public condemnation of the offender is meant to 
create feelings of guilt, self-awareness and remorse,166 but whether that can 
occur if the sentence is disproportionately severe or inequitable is doubtful. 
Regardless of the mental health status of the offender, there is a point when 
a sentence is simply too long to serve any rehabilitative purpose. In the 
United States, sentences for many are simply too long, which motivated the 
recent enactment of the First Step Act.167  
Again, whether all offenders are able to attain a sense of reforming 
contrition from the criminal justice system is questionable. Juvenile 
offenders, who are still undergoing rapid brain and moral development, may 
be more receptive to learning empathy.168 On the other hand, an offender’s 
mere desire to reform without the skills or capacity to do so, because of 
addiction or mental illness, could be fruitless.169 Perhaps the greatest pending 
 
164 St. Thomas Aquinas, Whether Vengeance is Lawful in PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 135, 135 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972). 
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exclusion, may develop neural pathways that promote empathy), with Kristin N. 
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risk of misusing mental health strategies are those that deprive offenders of 
autonomy by suppressing impulses through neurological treatment, and 
offering this as an alternative to prison: 
Even though the idea of preventing future crimes by 
neurotechnical treatment of criminals may, as indicated, 
strike some almost as science fictional, from a penal 
theoretical perspective, it is more déjà vu. A large part of the 
penal theoretical thinking of the last century was heavily 
influenced by rehabilitationist ideals.170 
A less accommodating view of neuroscientific interventions in the criminal 
justice system suggests that public censure remains an important component 
of justice for all offenders, communicating a sense of retributive justice and 
respecting the autonomy of the individual offender.171 That is, an 
anesthetized offender cannot be truly reformed, even if there is a utilitarian 
purpose in forced medication approaches, and the crime victim would yet 
again be silenced in the process. 
 
IV. HOW EMERGENCY RESPONSES TO COVID-19 IN PRISONS 
REVEAL SYSTEMIC PRIORITIES 
While sentencing theory can aid an evaluation of rational measures 
of justice, in reality, the practicalities of any ordered system are unpredictable 
and hybrid approaches emerge.172 Public health emergencies force judges to 
prioritize which factors should take precedence in determining whether and 
when a prisoner could be released, including considerations of 
 
170 Jesper Ryberg, Neuroscientific Treatment of Criminals and Penal Theory in 
TREATMENT FOR CRIME: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON NEUROINTERVENTIONS IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (David Birks & Thomas Douglas, eds., 2018) (arguing that 
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purposes). 
171 David Berks, Can Neurointerventions Communicate Censure? in DAVID 
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neurointerventions with harmful side effects would be the only means of 
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172 Cf. Gabriel A. Fuentes, Federal Detention and “Wild Facts” During the 
COVID-19 Pandemic, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 441, 442 (2020) 
(“‘wild facts’ are ‘subtle, unexpected particulars’ that lie not in law but in human 
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proportionality, perceived dangerousness to the community, crime victim 
perspectives, and health risks.  
As seen from the Black Death in the Medieval Ages to modern crises 
such as the AIDS epidemic, plague can bring discredit to political leadership 
when it appears to fail to come to the defense of the common welfare, leading 
to lawlessness, distrust, and an incentive for governments to respond with 
harsh and restrictive policies.173 Highly communicable contagions, such as 
the bubonic plague and smallpox, have impacted culture, class, and 
government throughout the centuries, and are increasing in occurrence as 
population and climate change bring different species in contact with each 
other.174 Even today, culture and politics interfere with scientific and medical 
best practices. For example, despite a global vaccination campaign in effect 
since 2000, measles still killed over 140,000 persons worldwide in 2018, with 
some deaths involving parents who refused to allow their children to be 
vaccinated, although the campaign prevented an estimated 23.2 million child 
deaths.175 More coercive modern public health approaches rapidly gaining 
political clout as the COVID-19 epidemic rages on are, at times, justifiably 
more concerned with the survival of the human species than with 
considerations of individual civil liberties. However, this temporary exercise 
in enhanced state control can shift public willingness towards diminishing 
civil liberties after the emergency subsides. 
A. Pre-COVID-19 Legal Approaches to Contagion in Prison 
In the prison system, the widespread and imminent risk of contagious 
disease permits a unique view into how the judicial system reevaluates the 
balance of interests between public and private priorities. According to the 
Supreme Court of Oregon, the role of government in such circumstances is 
paramount: 
As we all know, a novel coronavirus was first detected in 
late 2019, and it has spread rapidly across the globe, killing 
hundreds of thousands of people. Even more people have 
 
173 See DAVID HERLIHY, THE BLACK DEATH AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
WEST 64, 69 (1997). 
174 See Robert S.Gottfried, A Natural History of the Plague and Other Early 
European Diseases in THE BLACK DEATH 29 (Don Nardo ed.,1999). 
175 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Progress Toward Regional 
Measles Elimination – Worldwide, 2000–2018, 68 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP. 1 (Dec. 6, 2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/68/wr/pdfs/mm6848a1-H.pdf. 
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fallen ill, and healthcare systems in cities around the world 
have been overwhelmed, including in the United States. As 
the virus has spread, government leaders have taken actions 
to protect people in their jurisdictions from illness and death. 
They have done so in constantly changing circumstances, 
and they have responded to new information about the virus 
and its effects as it has become available.176 
In 2020, when the deadly and highly contagious COVID-19 virus struck the 
prison environment with a vengeance,177 judges and prison authorities were 
faced with an influx of varied legal motions to release prisoners early for 
their own safety.  
For example, in Illinois, Governor Pritzker issued an Executive 
Order pursuant to the state’s Emergency Management Agency Act 
specifically setting aside statutory restrictions so as to grant the Department 
of Corrections Director “with discretion to use medical furloughs to allow 
medically vulnerable inmates to temporarily leave IDOC facilities, when 
necessary and appropriate and taking into account the health and safety of 
the inmate, as well as the health and safety of other inmates and staff in IDOC 
facilities and the community[.]”178 By June 2020, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention reported that the case rate for COVID-19 was 5.5 
times higher among the prison and jail populations than among the general 
populations.179 “Mass testing in select prisons revealed wide COVID-19 
outbreaks, with infection rates exceeding 65% in several facilities.”180 
At the federal level, in March 2020, U.S. Attorney William Barr 
issued a memorandum encouraging the Bureau of Prisons to exercise its 
 
176 Elkhorn Baptist Church v. Brown, 366 Ore. 506, 509 (2020) (addressing a 
challenge to the Governor’s Executive Order to limit the size of gatherings to ensure 
social distancing and reduce COVID-19 transmission). 
177 See Emily Widra, Visualizing Changes in the Incarcerated Population 
During COVID-19, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Sept. 10, 2020), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/09/10/pandemic_population_changes/ 
(identifying higher rates of COVID-19 transmission and deaths in the prison 
population than in the general population); Dan Rozenzweig-Ziff, Incarcerated 
Texans are Dying from COVID-19 at a Rate 35% Higher than Rest of the U.S. Prison 
Population, UT Study Finds, TEXAN TRIB. (Nov. 10, 2020), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/11/10/texas-prison-deaths-coronavirus/.  
178 Governor Pritzker, COVID-19 Executive Order No. 19, State of Illinois 
(April 6, 2020). 
179 Brendan Saloner et al., COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Federal and State 
Prisons, 324 JAMA 602, 602–03 (Aug. 11, 2020). 
180 Id. at 603. 
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authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2) to permit home confinement rather 
than incarceration, in order to avoid risks to certain prisoners from COVID-
19. Specifically, for “some at-risk inmates who are non-violent and pose 
minimal likelihood of recidivism and who might be safer serving their 
sentences in home confinement rather than in BOP facilities.”181 By January 
2021, the Office of the Attorney General issued an additional memorandum 
reminding the Bureau of Prisons that home confinement measures were only 
temporary and that prisoners should be “recalled” to correctional facilities 
following the covered emergency period under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, 
and Economic Security (CARES) Act if they had not completed their 
sentences.182 By December 2020, approximately 12% of the federal prison 
population had been transferred to home confinement, of which 40% would 
not have been eligible for such release without emergency authority.183 No 
mention was made of crime victim input as a factor of consideration for the 
initial decision to engage in home confinement in these memoranda, nor of 
their input regarding return to a correctional facility.  
Public health advocates and scholars were well aware that prisons 
would be among the hardest hit by a disease pandemic, because they had 
already experienced managing other contagions.184 However, this current 
pandemic presented an opportunity to reduce growing concerns related to 
mass incarceration and to test the role and value of victim involvement in the 
criminal justice system. Also, in order to understand how a pandemic brings 
to light criminal justice system priorities, understanding the parallel coercive 
 
181 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF BUREAU 
OF PRISONS FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: PRIORITIZATION OF HOME 
CONFINEMENT AS APPROPRIATE IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 PANDEMIC (2020). 
182 See Memorandum Opinion from Jennifer L. Mascott, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General to the General Counsel for the Federal Bureau of Prisons, on Home 
Confinement of Federal Prisoners After the COVID-19 Emergency (Jan. 15, 2021) 
(addressing the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act); see 
also Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease 
(COVID-19) Outbreak, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (2020). The “‘covered emergency 
period’” starts on “the date on which the President declared a national emergency 
under the National Emergencies Act with respect to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 
(COVID-19)” [March 13, 2020] and ends “30 days after the date on which the 
national emergency declaration terminates.” CARES Act § 12003(a)(2).   
183 Memorandum Opinion from Jennifer L. Mascott, at 3. 
184 See Lawrence O. Gostin et al.¸ The Law and the Public’s Health: A Study of 
Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 99 (1999) 
(“Population growth, urban migration, and overcrowding in the congregate settings 
of prisons, homeless shelters, mental institutions, nursing homes, and child care 
centers facilitate person-to -person transmission of disease.”). 
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practices and policies of public health is also key. In an era involving more 
frequent global contagions, civil rights advocates in the United States, prior 
to the COVID-19 epidemic, had been arguing for greater attention to the 
constitutional rights to resist public health quarantines and the risk to civil 
liberties in granting public health authorities excessive, indiscriminate 
power.185 Deep ethical concerns are at stake. For example, in In re 
Washington, a patient mother who had recently delivered a baby in the 
hospital refused to cooperate when she was ordered into quarantine for a 
diagnosis of non-infectious tuberculosis, and was forced by court order to 
remain in long-term quarantine in the county jail, rather than a health facility, 
to prevent the disease from becoming contagious.186  
Reflecting on the Ebola crisis that emerged in the summer of 2014 
and other global epidemics, Professor Wendy Parmet argued that “quarantine 
is rarely an effective public health strategy, and no evidence exists that it has 
proven effective in reducing morbidity and mortality in the U.S. in the last 
half century.”187 Public health scholar Lawrence Gostin also called for less 
compulsory measures to curb contagions when he wrote, regarding the 
spread of tuberculosis, that coercive measures may counterintuitively deter 
more persons from seeking testing and treatment, thereby increasing the risk 
to public health.188 In stark contrast, during the COVID-19 pandemic, when 
the disease was swiftly spreading among inmates, guards and other staff, 
prisoners cried out for greater quarantine and social distancing measures, or 
to be released if that could not be accomplished. Those most vulnerable to 
COVID-19 in the general population, low-income persons of color, have 
comprised those most likely to face higher incarceration rates in the United 
States.189 
 
185 See Wendy E. Parmet, Quarantining the Law of Quarantine: Why 
Quarantine Law Does Not Reflect Contemporary Constitutional Law, 9 WAKE 
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2018). 
186 In re Washington, 304 Wis. 2d 98, 128 (2007). 
187 See generally Parmet, supra note 185, at 28– 29 (criticizing China, as well, 
for “wide-scale quarantines for SARS”).  
188 Gostin, supra note 159, at 130. 
189 See Lucy Erickson, The Disproportionate Impact of COVID-19 on Women 
of Color, SOC’Y FOR WOMEN’S HEALTH RES. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://swhr.org/the-
disproportionate-impact-of-covid-19-on-women-of-color/; Michael Ollove, How 
COVID-19 in Jails and Prisons Threatens Nearby Communities, PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS: STATELINE BLOG (July 1, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-
and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/07/01/how-covid-19-in-jails-and-prisons-
threatens-nearby-communities.  
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The numerous serious contagious illnesses that have stricken prison 
populations over the years have been approached with varying urgency by 
the courts.190 Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, prisoners had filed early 
release or transfer claims on the basis of medical conditions, including 
dangerous airborne contagions191 or exposure to bloodborne pathogens.192 
The courts considered whether the risks were those experienced primarily in 
prison or also in the society at large.193 Even with the latitude to consider 
numerous factors, state decisionmakers have chosen not to weigh crime 
victims’ perspectives to any significant extent in these early release cases. A 
prisoner’s medical condition, however, has garnered attention, possibly more 
in previous years than during the reviews of COVID-19 compassionate 
release petitions, as will be discussed below.194 This may have been due not 
only to timing, where the courts now face the urgency of a global pandemic, 
but to the sheer number of cases involved and the practical need to make a 
quick determination without a public hearing.  
In any case, the courts consistently have recognized that the 
government has a duty to care for the health and safety of its prisoners. Under 
the common law parens patriae doctrine, the United States Supreme Court 
has held that prisoners under government supervision are entitled to a 
 
190 See generally Uribe v. Perez, No. 5:17-00558 CJC (ADS), 2020 WL 1318358 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2020) (providing an overview of cases where the courts have 
found an unacceptable and serious health risk of disease in prison, such as MRSA, 
hepatitis C, HIV, and tuberculosis, as well as environmental hazards, such as tobacco 
smoke and asbestos, but declining to recognize norovirus as an unacceptable health 
risk). 
191 See, e.g., Jackson v. Brown, No. 1:13–cv–1055–LJO–SAB, 2015 WL 
5522088 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2015) (denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
in a racial discrimination claim as to whether California state prison authorities were 
required to better protect at-risk African-American inmates from the deadly flu-like 
infection known as Valley Fever), rev’d in part by Hines v. Youssef, 914 F. 3d 1218 
(9th Cir. 2019) (denying a race-based equal protection claim for risk of contracting 
Valley Fever). 
192 See Patel v. County of Orange, No. 8:17-cv-01954-JLS-DFM, 2019 WL 
4238875 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2019) (addressing plaintiffs’ claim that being forced to 
clean up blood after an inmate’s suicide, without adequate protective gear, caused 
them to experience “depression, insomnia, nightmares, an inability to eat, panic 
attacks, and loss of libido”). 
193 Jackson v. Brown, 2015 WL 5522088, at *23 (“And to determine whether 
the risk posed is one society is willing to tolerate, the Court must assess whether the 
complained-of exposure to cocci and the resultant incidence rates of Valley Fever 
are similar to those of other communities where cocci are endemic.”). 
194 See infra Part IV(B). 
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minimal level of medical care, a right that the general population does not 
have.195 The Court referred to the “common-law view that ‘(i)t[sic] is but just 
that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of 
the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.’”196 As Justice Stevens stated 
in dissent in Estelle v. Gamble, “denial of medical care is surely not part of 
the punishment which civilized nations may impose for crime.”197 
Since the 1980s, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the virus 
that causes acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) has remained a 
systemic concern among inmates in terms of adequacy of treatment, the risk 
of infection among inmates due to drug use and needle-sharing, and 
transmission through sexual contact.198 The latter inferred a lack of security 
in the prison setting by the inability to prevent forced sexual contact, 
demonstrated in part by the necessity for the legal protections of the Prison 
Rape Elimination Act of 2003.199 By 1997, the rate of confirmed AIDS in the 
U.S. prison population was “more than five times higher than the rate in the 
general population.”200 Ten years later, the incidence of AIDS in prison has 
remained three to five times the incidence in the general population.201 While 
mandatory testing is not required by many jail or prison facilities, in some 
jurisdictions crime victims may require HIV testing of offenders if the victim 
was placed at risk of infection.202 For example, in the State of New York 
victims of sexual violence offenses may require a defendant be tested for HIV 
and that the results be communicated to the victim and defendant.203 
Segregation of prisoners with HIV has, however, been successfully 
 
195 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-
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David M. Siegal, Rape in Prison and AIDS: A Challenge for the Eighth Amendment 
Framework of Wilson v. Seiter, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1541 (1992). 
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challenged as it restricts available programming and creates unnecessary and 
harmful stigma.204 
Tuberculosis has also posed challenges for inmates in correctional 
facilities. Because HIV causes a weakened immune system, it increases the 
risk by a hundred fold of developing active tuberculosis among those who 
have latent tuberculosis.205 By 1980, in New York state correctional facilities, 
ninety-five percent of inmates with tuberculosis were infected with HIV, as 
well.206 As an airborne disease, the close living quarters and lack of 
ventilation, as well as inadequate medical services, contributed to the 
tuberculosis crisis.207 Lawrence Gostin attributed some of the rapid increase 
in transmission of tuberculosis to the overcrowding that occurred from 
mandatory sentencing of drug offenses in the 1990s and resulting mass 
incarceration.208  
State jurisdictions evaluating early release claims will not employ 
the factors discussed below under the federal First Step Act of 2018 for 
compassionate release.209 Indeed, state law varies more than federal as to 
which factors are relevant for release. At sentencing in Michigan, for 
example, the trial court would only consider the statutory element of “the 
seriousness of the circumstances surrounding” the defendant and the offense, 
in addition to a possible medical probation or commutation if the medical 
needs of the defendant were sufficiently serious at the time of sentencing.210 
The court in at least one case determined that it would not have been 
appropriate to impose a more lenient sentence later, even if the trial court had 
been aware of the pandemic at the time of sentencing.211 Other efforts to 
obtain release in state court, such as judicial release to home confinement, 
may not be available even for heightened risks due to COVID-19 if the 
 
204 See Henderson v. Thomas, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (holding 
that segregation of prisoners on the basis of HIV-status violates the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, which permit suits against prisons as 
public entities). But see Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. 
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Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination against an individual with a 
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205 Lee, supra note 200, at 370 (citing Centers for Disease Control data). 
206 Gostin, supra note 159, at 51.  
207 Id. at 52. 
208 Id. at 53. 
209 See infra Part IV(B). 
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2021). 
211 Id.  
240   U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y   [Vol. XV No. 1 
 
defendant was serving a mandatory term and did not produce substantial 
supporting documentation of risk from correction officials.212 Still other 
states, such as California, have implemented a strict legislative requirement 
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, including initiation of a 
compassionate release claim by prison or parole authorities, before a court of 
appeal will consider an order appealable.213  
For state prisoners, medical parole continues to be an option for early 
release, when inmates have terminal health conditions or may be so 
incapacitated that they cannot care for themselves.214 Such policies indicate 
that medical parole is an option when an existing medical condition changes. 
That is, “[g]enerally, medical parole consideration shall not be given to an 
offender when the offender’s medical condition was present at the time of 
sentencing, unless the overall condition has significantly deteriorated since 
that time.”215 Medical concerns are not the sole consideration where the risk 
to public safety upon parole may result in a denial of a petition. Here, the 
crime victim’s perspective offers important information to the court. The 
California Court of Appeals, for example, held that an inmate who had 
become a quadriplegic should receive medical parole as he no longer posed 
a threat to public safety, despite the court’s recognition that he had been 
sentenced for the heinous crimes of physical and sexual violence against 
women, and continued to engage in similar behavior while incarcerated.216 
According to the court, “[w]e are satisfied that Martinez’s behavior problems 
are ‘some evidence’ that he remains an angry, repulsive person,” but he does 
not pose “a reasonable threat to public safety” if released.217  
 
212 E.g., State v. Watkins, No. 20AP-313, 2020 WL 6503632, at *9 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2020), granting stay pending appeal, 160 Ohio St. 3d 1516 (Ohio 2020). 
213 See People v. Bryant, 2020 WL 5012135, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) 
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214 See, e.g., Buckman v. Commissioner of Correction, 484 Mass. 14, 138 N.E. 
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terminal illness or incapacitation for a petition to initiate a claim for medical parole 
are void as against public policy).  
215 Ducksworth v. Louisiana Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr., 298 So. 3d 757, 759 
(La. Ct. App. 2020) (affirming a dismissal of a petition for medical parole with 
prejudice where the defendant presented no medical evidence that his laryngeal 
condition had become permanent). 
216 In re Martinez, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 657, 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing 
denial of a habeas corpus petition for medical parole). 
217 Id. at 673-74. 
2021] The Revelatory Nature of COVID-19  241 
Another avenue for relief in state court is a writ of habeas corpus 
alleging illegal confinement due to medical need. For example, the Superior 
Court of Connecticut addressed a 58-year-old petitioner with HIV who filed 
a habeas corpus petition seeking release from state prison through emergency 
compassionate release or medical parole due to the risk of contracting 
COVID-19 and its significant risks associated with his lowered immune 
system.218 The prisoner informed the court that he had hepatitis C, kidney 
problems, cirrhosis of the liver, high blood pressure, and bipolar disorder.219 
However, the writ was denied, in part, for procedural reasons: in Connecticut 
the granting of medical parole is only within the discretion of the Board of 
Pardons and Paroles, not the trial court, and his treating physician in the 
prison facility explained that petitioner’s immunity had improved with 
medication while in prison.220 In its decision, the trial court quoted the United 
States Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan, which held that “[t]he 
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit 
inhumane ones” pursuant to the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause.221  
If the prison authorities are not responsive, state and federal prisoners 
with medical needs may file constitutional claims under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which may provide 
compensatory damage awards as opposed to early release.222 However, 
qualified immunity poses a challenge to claimants unless the claimant can 
demonstrate that the official violated a constitutional right and that the right 
was clearly established at the time of the conduct in question.223 Potential 
constitutional claims include assertions that deprivation of medical and 
mental health treatment demonstrates the state’s deliberate indifference to the 
prisoner’s serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Substantive Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause. For example, the estate of an inmate who 
committed suicide while in solitary confinement unsuccessfully brought a 
 
218 McKinnon v. Comm’r of Corr., CV205000659S, 2020 WL 4814245 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2020). 
219 Id. at *3. 
220 Id. at *3-4 (explaining that the inmate had also tested negative for COVID-
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221 Id. at *2 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). 
222 E.g., Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209, 1213-15 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
deprivation of necessary tuberculosis medication constituted an Eighth Amendment 
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223 Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 745 (2014) (internal citations omitted). 
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civil rights action against a municipal corrections facility responsible for 
monitoring the inmate.224 It is a difficult standard to meet, where deliberation 
on the part of state actors is required, rather than mere negligence. In a 
deliberate indifference claim by an older inmate with Alzheimer’s disease 
and other serious medical conditions who alleged delays in treatment, the 
court dispatched with the claim “because Dr. Murphy was the only physician 
treating more than two thousand inmates.”225  
All of these rights must be balanced against “legitimate penological 
interests.”226 Constitutional claims related to an inmate’s serious health needs 
may consider risks to the public health, such as the denial of a due process 
and equal protection claim by a prisoner with HIV who was denied the right 
to conjugal visits in consideration of the risk of transmission to the visitor.227 
While these civil rights claims may be a wise legal strategy in many 
instances, if time is short and the emergency is urgent, they are not an 
effective approach. They simply take too long to achieve a disposition, 
particularly given their procedural hurdles.  
In the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, compassionate 
release claims were not the first line of defense for inmates. In Wilson v. 
Williams, for example, the Sixth Circuit addressed a federal habeas corpus 
petition filed as a class action asserting an Eighth Amendment deliberate 
indifference claim for alleged failure to provide safe prison conditions during 
the pandemic in a low security facility with dormitory-style housing.228 By 
April 2020, fifty-nine inmates and forty-six staff members had contracted 
COVID-19 in the facility, and six inmates had died.229 The District Court 
granted a preliminary injunction and enforcement order against the Bureau 
of Prisons on April 22, 2020. Weeks later, on June 9, 2020, the Sixth Circuit 
addressed the Bureau of Prisons’ interlocutory appeal. The Bureau of Prisons 
admitted the objective factor that the risk of COVID-19 had created “a 
 
224 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., 979 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2020) 
(affirming the lower court’s determination that the municipality did not act with 
deliberate indifference to serious medical need). 
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228 Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020). Habeas relief is also 
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 
229 Id. at 834. 
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substantial risk of serious harm leading to pneumonia, respiratory failure, or 
death.”230 But as to the subjective prong, the court in Wilson, in accord with 
several other federal Circuit Courts of Appeal, held that the Bureau of Prisons 
had not been deliberately indifferent to such risk despite the Bureau’s 
struggle to cope with the rapidly evolving events of the pandemic.231  
In vacating the preliminary injunction granted by the District Court 
in Wilson, the Sixth Circuit held that because the Bureau of Prisons had 
engaged in cleaning, social distancing, quarantine, and testing in the facility, 
“its failure to make robust use of transfer, home confinement, or furlough to 
remove inmates in the medically-vulnerable subclass . . . does not constitute 
deliberate indifference.”232 The court noted as a final point that the District 
Court should have more carefully considered “the legitimate concerns about 
public safety the BOP raised,” as supported by the United States Supreme 
Court’s instruction that when the Government is the opposing party in a 
motion for injunctive relief, the interests of the opposing party and the public 
interest merge.233 Thus, where prisoners are concerned, the voice of the 
community and victim is ultimately that of the government. If crime victim 
rights are not available, the actual voice of the victim is rendered a nullity. 
Administrative, procedural, and time-consuming hurdles are 
daunting in a case, such as the following, that involve the high risks of 
COVID-19 transmission in a state geriatric prison. In Valentine v. Collier, 
the United States Supreme Court denied an application to vacate the Fifth 
Circuit’s stay of a preliminary injunction against the Texas Department of 
Criminal Justice.234 Even Justices Sotomayor and Ginsberg wrote that 
“[n]othing in this Court's order, of course, prevents the Fifth Circuit from 
amending its stay. Nor does anything in our order prevent applicants from 
seeking new relief in the District Court, as appropriate, based on changed 
circumstances.”235 Yet the Fifth Circuit noted in originally issuing the stay of 
the District Court injunction that an enforcement order against the 
correctional facilities would prevent them “from responding to the COVID-
19 threat without a permission slip from the district court.”236 Thus, while 
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time is of the essence for prisoners at risk of infection, the prison system also 
needs flexibility and discretion to adapt in an emergency. Also, the Fifth 
Circuit had identified the significant barrier to litigation under the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requiring inmates 
to exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal 
court to challenge state prison conditions.237 The United States Supreme 
Court has outlined very narrow exceptions,238 which have not applied to most 
COVID-19 litigation for safer conditions. Thus, for the reasons shown above, 
compassionate release under the First Step Act of 2018 ultimately became 
the strategy of choice for most inmates seeking relief from the dangers of the 
pandemic as it serves as a swifter and more permanent remedy. 
B. COVID-19 Compassionate Release Cases Under the First 
Step Act 
The First Step Act of 2018, signed into law on December 21, 2018 
by President Trump, allows a defendant to move a federal court to grant 
compassionate release after the defendant has “fully exhausted all 
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a 
motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of 
such request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is 
earlier.”239 The thirty-day exhaustion period is substantially less than many 
other potentially applicable claims, and some jurisdictions have permitted 
waiver.240 
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state post-conviction relief). 
238 Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1859-60 (2016) (including when procedures 
are a mere “dead end,” when an “opaque” administrative scheme cannot reasonably 
be accessed, and when prison officials “thwart” prisoners from using existing 
grievance processes). 
239 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2018). 
240 See, e.g., U.S. v. Atwi, 455 F. Supp. 3d 426 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (permitting 
waiver of the exhaustion requirement for compassionate release); but see U.S. v. 
Brown, Crim. No. 3:18-CR-228-DPJ-FKB, 2020 WL 3213415 (S.D. Miss. June 15, 
2020), reconsideration denied, 2020 WL 5723524 (S.D. Miss. 2020) (denying a 
compassionate release claim without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies); U.S. v. Robinson, Crim. Action No. 1:17CR27-3, 2020 WL 3182719 
(N.D. W. Va. June 15, 2020) (denial for failure to exhaust remedies). 
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Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing 
Commission has stated that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” must 
exist for compassionate release.241 There is currently a split in authority 
regarding the role of the Bureau of Prisons and whether federal courts may 
now “independently determine what constitutes other ‘extraordinary and 
compelling reasons’ for compassionate release.”242 Nevertheless, expressly 
stated factors include whether:  
1) a defendant has a terminal or serious medical condition;  
2) a defendant with deteriorating health is at least 65 years old and has 
served ten years or 75% of the term of imprisonment;  
3) certain family circumstances arise in which a defendant must serve as 
a caregiver for minor children or a partner; or  
4) the Bureau of Prisons determines other circumstances create 
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” for sentence reduction.243 
As to the final catch-all factor, no particular sentencing theory, 
policy or goal is noted, which provides broad discretion to the trial court and 
the Bureau Prisons to favor the priorities that they wish when identifying 
reasons for granting or denying a motion for compassionate release. From a 
legal practitioner’s perspective, any exercise of government discretion 
invites a degree of arbitrariness, and compassionate release decisions have 
been no different: “Whether a prisoner is released depends on a host of 
influences, including the judge who sentenced them, the warden over the 
facility where they are held, and the prosecutors. It involves politics, 
geographic influence and aspects of complete randomness beyond the 
prisoner's control.”244 Judges cannot help but be influenced by their “own 
beliefs of morality and proper behavior”245 when assessing release factors. 
While such a position is difficult to refute, in a cursory review of the appellate 
 
241 For a history of the compassionate release statutory framework, see Lindsey 
E. Wylie et al., Extraordinary and Compelling: The Use of Compassionate Release 
Laws in the United States, 24 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 216 (2018).  
242 See, e.g., U.S. v. Richardson, Crim. No. JKB-09-0288, 2020 WL 3267989 
(D. Md. June 17, 2020) (federal courts may judge factors independently); but see 
U.S. v. Aruda, 472 F. Supp. 3d 847 (D. Haw. 2020) (only the Bureau of Prisons may 
judge the factors for compassionate release). 
243 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)–(D) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
244 Joe D. Whitley et al., A Prisoner’s Dilemma: COVID-19 and Motions for 
Compassionate Release, PRACT. INSIGHTS COMMENT, May 28, 2020, 2020 WL 
2762836. 
245 KENNEDY & SACCO, supra note 6, at 184-85. 
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decisions regarding COVID-19 compassionate release in 2020 and 2021 to 
date, some preliminary patterns do emerge as to what is and is not considered 
of significance at this historic time.  
1. Health and Safety of Prisoners 
With respect to the first factor addressing “a terminal or serious 
medical condition,” courts have generally looked to the CDC COVID-19 
guidelines to define which medical conditions create a substantial risk of 
contracting the virus.246 Courts and inmates have been expected to track the 
CDC’s occasional revision of the list of risk factors during the pendency of 
an appeal.247  
“The mere existence of COVID-19 in society” is not enough to 
warrant compassionate release, according to the Third Circuit in United 
States v. Raia, a case in which the court denied compassionate release to a 
68-year-old inmate with Parkinson’s disease, diabetes, and heart disease.248 
Prior to the pandemic, a similar position generally was taken, where the Fifth 
Circuit, in evaluating a deliberate indifference constitutional claim, asserted 
that “isolated examples of illness, injury, or even death, standing alone, 
cannot prove that conditions of confinement are constitutionally inadequate. 
Nor can the incidence of diseases or infections, standing alone, imply 
unconstitutional confinement conditions, since any densely populated 
residence may be subject to outbreaks.”249 This appears to be a consistent 
theme in compassionate release jurisprudence. The Southern District of 
Mississippi explained,  
The Court agrees with other courts that have considered 
similar arguments and concluded that ‘[g]eneral concerns 
about the spread of COVID-19 or the mere fear of 
contracting an illness in prison are insufficient grounds to 
 
246 U.S. v. Patten, Crim. No. 18-cr-073-LM-1, 2021 WL 275444, at *3 (D. N.H. 
Jan. 27, 2021); see COVID-19, People with Certain Medical Conditions CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html (updated Feb. 3, 
2021). 
247 See U.S. v. Gionfriddo, No. 3:18-cr-00307 (JAM), 2020 WL 3603754, at *3 
(D. Conn. July 2, 2020); U.S. v. Belcher, No. 2:19-CR-00019-1-JRG-CRW, 2020 
WL 3620424 (E.D. Tenn. July 2, 2020). 
248 U.S. v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 2020). 
249 Shepherd v. Dallas County, 591 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming a 
jury verdict for a pretrial detainee denied access to medication with respect to a 
section 1983 federal civil rights claim).  
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establish the extraordinary and compelling reasons 
necessary to reduce a sentence.’ Were such concerns 
sufficient, every federal prisoner would be entitled to a 
sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A).250  
However, legal arguments could be made that some inmates with 
hypertension or anxiety-related mental health disorders could face intolerable 
fears from the knowledge of the risks of COVID-19 and deep frustration with 
lack of control over the discretionary factors permitting home confinement 
or parole.251 At least one court has mentioned in dicta that mental health 
deterioration as a basis for compassionate release would require a 
psychological evaluation to rule out malingering before such a petition would 
be granted.252 And yet, in the general population, it is widely accepted among 
mental health clinicians that a patient with preexisting mental illness will 
experience a stronger response due to COVID-19 fears and social distancing, 
precipitating relapses and heightened paranoia and distress.253 
The drug cases seem to represent a highly mixed approach with little 
recognition of the presence of addiction or the success of treatment. A 
striking commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines regarding compassionate 
release states that “rehabilitation of the defendant is not, by itself, an 
extraordinary and compelling reason for purposes of this policy 
statement.”254 For example, in United States v. Buford, the Eastern District 
of Michigan denied compassionate release to a 50-year-old inmate with a 
wife and children at home, who had been convicted of drug trafficking and 
who had a medical record of hypertension, asthma, diabetes, mild kidney 
disease, and had tested positive for COVID-19 but was asymptomatic.255 The 
same court granted compassionate release to an inmate convicted of selling 
cocaine, who had a kidney condition, latent tuberculosis of the lungs, and 
 
250 U.S. v. Brown, Crim. No. 3:18-CR-227-DPJ-FKB, 2020 WL 5723524, at *3 
(S.D. Miss. Sept. 24, 2020) (internal citation omitted) (relying on U.S. v. Koons, 455 
F. Supp. 3d 285 (W.D. La. 2020)). 
251 See, e.g., U.S. v. Mack, Crim. No. JKB-08-348, 2020 WL 3618985, at *2 (D. 
Md. July 2, 2020) (rejecting the stress of hypertension as an extraordinary and 
compelling reason for compassionate release, as it would be too similar a condition 
to “hundreds of other inmates”). 
252 U.S. v. Ebbers, 432 F. Supp. 3d 421, 431 n.12 (S.D. N.Y. 2020). 
253 See Seshadri Sekhar Chatterjee, Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on Pre-
existing Mental Health Problems, 51 ASIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 102071 (2020), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7165115/.  
254 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. n.3 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
255 U.S. v. Buford, No. 05-80955, 2020 WL 4040705 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2020). 
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who had family support.256 Judge Haight made a considered point in her view 
of the crime victim rights movement that is not often made; that is, that in 
drug cases in particular, there is an intersection between offenders and 
victims from the same community.257 “We have got to get serious about 
illegal drug use and anybody that wants to legalize drugs, please come sit in 
my court one day, one week and listen to the victims’ stories and listen to the 
defendants’ histories.”258  
The particularized factors that could have addressed the health and 
wellbeing of vulnerable prisoners seeking early release from COVID-19 
have not been met with much compassion under the First Step Act. As 
discussed below, the prisoner’s criminal record, disciplinary behavior in 
confinement, and time remaining on the sentence have mattered more to the 
courts, as an issue of risk of recidivism on public safety and proportionality. 
That is, just deserts and the government’s view of the defendant’s risk to 
society have predominated, not the prisoner’s health risks during a global 
pandemic, nor his or her potential for rehabilitation, and, as will be shown 
below, not the exercise of crime victim rights which could inject more 
directly a community perspective. 
2. Public Safety  
Allowing a focus on public safety as a factor in compassionate 
release cases has been fairly consistent, although not usually inclusive of the 
crime victim’s perspective. There is some debate as to the applicability of the 
Sentencing Guideline’s policy statement regarding the First Step Act of 2018 
in this regard.259 Some courts have required consideration of the additional 
factor of whether the defendant is “a danger to the safety of any other person 
 
256 U.S. v. Greene, Crim. No. 15-20709, 2020 WL 4581712 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 
10, 2020). 
257 Judge Lois Haight Interview Transcript, supra note 61. 
258 Id. 
259 See U.S. v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that “the 
Guidelines Manual lacks an ‘applicable’ policy statement covering prisoner-initiated 
applications for compassionate release” under The First Step Act of 2018 and 
therefore existing policy statements are inapplicable). At least one subsequent 
decision has held that as 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(C) already requires that a factor of 
sentencing include the need to “protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant,” whether section 3142(g) is applicable to ensure victim and public safety 
makes little difference. See U.S. v. Burnley, 834 F. App’x 270 (7th Cir. 2021); see 
also U.S. v. Aruda, 472 F. Supp. 3d 847 (D. Haw. 2020) (applying section 3553(a) 
to determine that a compassionate release petition should be denied as against public 
safety). 
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or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).”260 For this 
particular factor, the federal courts have relied on the presentencing report 
considering the nature of the defendant’s offense, length of criminal history, 
as well as infractions while in custody. Other public safety considerations 
include, for example, risks of violence, recidivism, and contagion, as shown 
below. 
The Western District of North Carolina effectively held such factors 
to be a potentially permanent bar to compassionate release: 
The Court appreciates the defendant's efforts to rehabilitate 
himself through completing educational and substance abuse 
programs and the risk that COVID-19 poses to those in 
custody. However, the Court is not persuaded that the 
defendant would not pose a danger to the community upon 
his release because of his repeated history of committing 
serious offenses while on conditions of release.261 
Courts have also accepted and relied in part on victim impact 
statements expressing continued fear for their safety, such as one in which 
the offender had only recently been arrested for hate crimes against the victim 
“and other Black members of our citizenry.”262 When crime victim and public 
safety are considered for prisoners seeking compassionate release, the 
Seventh Circuit indicated that when the nature of the offense included death 
threats rather than physical conduct, the inmate’s terminal cancer and risk of 
contracting COVID-19 would not override the interest in public safety.263 In 
contrast, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted a compassionate 
release petition for an ill prisoner who had served 17 years of a 20-year 
sentence for low-level drug dealing and who had no violent criminal record, 
also noting that he had a reentry plan and family.264 The court explained that 
“[n]one of these reasons alone is extraordinary and compelling,” but “taken 
together” they are, including the lack of risk to public safety.265  
 
260 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13(2) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018). 
261 U.S. v. Hardin, No. 3:17-cr-00200-RJC-DSC, 2020 WL 4700724 (W.D. N.C. 
Aug. 13, 2020) (relying primarily on the dangerousness factor to deny compassionate 
release). 
262 See U.S. v. Desimas, No. 2:20-cr-00222-RAJ, 2021 WL 289336, at *2 (W.D. 
Wash. Jan. 28, 2021). 
263 U.S. v. Burnley, 834 F. App’x 270 (7th Cir. 2021) (relying also on the 
inmate’s lack of remorse and disciplinary violations while incarcerated). 
264 U.S. v. Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 392 (E.D. Pa. 2020). 
265 Id. at 401. 
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Finally, the very health condition that increases the risk of COVID-
19 transmission may also form the basis of the reason to deny compassionate 
release in the interests of public safety, such as drug addiction and continued 
drug use266 or an inmate who has already contracted COVID-19.267 With 
respect to unsanitary and overcrowded jail conditions for pretrial detainees 
in Louisiana, the court agreed that it would serve the public interest if the 
detention facility took greater care of detainees, remarking: “Plaintiffs point 
out that pre-trial detainees are housed for a relatively short period of time and 
are often released back into the community, and that the injunction [to ensure 
COVID-19 safety precautions] will prevent unnecessary illness in a group of 
people who will soon return to live among the general population.”268 Thus, 
coercive public health interests in quarantine are shown to override the 
prisoner’s own health risks and vulnerabilities. 
3. Victim Impact 
Only occasionally is the crime victim’s voice ever noted or 
considered,269 but it also seems that most federal compassionate release cases 
addressed have been nonviolent or victimless.270 Certainly, in some 
emotionally difficult cases, victims of crime may not wish to be heard on the 
 
266 See U.S. v. Aruda, 472 F. Supp. 3d 847 (D. Haw. 2020). 
267 U.S. v. Riley, No. 14-cr-30055, 2020 WL 4036381 (C.D. Ill. July 17, 2020). 
268 Baqer v. St. Tammany Par. Gov., 2020 WL 1820040, at *4, 14 (E.D. La. Apr. 
11, 2020) (failing to circumvent the strict exhaustion requirements of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, and noting that Section 3142(g) also applies to release of 
pretrial detainees). 
269 E.g., U.S. v. Apicella, No. 2:18-cr-49-FtM-38NPM, 2020 WL 7260760 
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2020) (explaining that the victim’s objection to compassionate 
release was taken into account and that release would violate the victim’s right to 
reasonable protection under the Crime Victim’s Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1)); 
U.S. v. Bischoff, 460 F. Supp. 3d 122, 128 (D. N.H. 2020) (considering victim’s 
opposition to compassionate release of an offender convicted of fraud, but granting 
release due to his health risks); U.S. v. Ebbers, 432 F. Supp. 3d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) 
(explaining that the federal District Court had sua sponte required the Government 
to notify the victims in the case of the petition for compassion release in accordance 
with the Crime Victims’ Rights Act). 
270 E.g., U.S. v. Snow, Crim. Action No. 5:18-CR-52-TBR, 2021 WL 260667 
(W.D. Ky. Jan. 26, 2021) (denying the petition of a victimless offender, where 
“[g]ranting him compassionate release when he has served only 14 months of a ten-
year sentence would also lead to unwarranted sentence disparities and would be 
unjust in light of the serious and reckless nature of his crimes.”). 
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matter of compassionate release,271 or they may feel even more strongly 
regarding the need to communicate their wishes to the court.272 They also 
may feel quite differently from each other regarding the same offender’s 
petition for compassionate release.273 
At the federal level, pursuant to the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 
victims of crime have the right to notice of any public court proceeding 
involving the crime or “of any release or escape of the accused.”274 Victims 
also have the right to be heard at any public proceeding involving “release, 
plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.”275 The key limitation is the term 
“public proceeding.” With respect to managing compassionate release 
motions under section 603(b) of The First Step Act, in August 2020, the Chief 
Justice of the Southern District of Illinois issued an Administrative Order 
stating that “the U.S. Attorney’s Office is permitted to provide notice of any 
motion for compassionate release to any victim.”276 The Order only briefly 
recognized the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, including its required notice to 
victims and a right to be heard in public hearings related to an inmate’s 
release.277 However, due to the “volume of motions being filed” within a 
 
271 E.g., U.S. v. Chambers, No. 08-cr-30057, 2020 WL 6270274 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 
23, 2020), pending appeal, U.S. v. Chambers (7th Cir. 2020) (explaining the victim 
declined to comment regarding a petition for compassionate release by an offender 
convicted of enticement of minors and transportation of child pornography); U.S. v. 
Watson, No. 3:18-cr-00025-MMD-CLB-1, 2020 WL 4251802 (D. Nev. July 22, 
2020) (requesting victim responses regarding a petitioner convicted of possession of 
child pornography, but receiving none). 
272 U.S. v. Cotterman, No. CR-07-01207-001-TUC-RCC (CRP), 2020 WL 
6395444 (D. Ariz. Nov. 2, 2020) (holding that to release a child sexual abuse 
offender after only one-third of his sentence was complete “would be an affront to 
the victim’s sense of justice”). 
273 See, e.g., U.S. v. Doobay, No. 3:16-cr-122-J-32MCR, 2020 WL 5749921 
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2020) (noting that one crime victim supported release of a 
petition involving mail and wire fraud, while other crime victims in the case opposed 
release); U.S. v. Williams, 456 F. Supp. 3d 414 (D. Conn. 2020).  
274 Crime Victim Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2) (2018). 
275 Id. at § 3771(a)(4). 
276 In re Compassionate Release Provision of the First Step Act of 2018, Admin. 
Order No. 265, (S.D. Ill.) (Aug. 14, 2020), 
https://www.ilsd.uscourts.gov/Forms/AdminOrder265FourthAmendment.pdf 
(addressing the First Step Act of 2018, P.L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018)). 
277 See U.S. v. Haynes, 456 F. Supp. 3d 496 (E.D. N.Y. 2020) (deciding that 
victim statements and notification were not required under the Crime Victims’ 
Rights Act because the court would assess the petition on the writings, not in a public 
hearing). 
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short time,278 a number of the decisions of courts in this jurisdiction appear 
to have occurred without a public hearing and involved “victimless” drug 
crimes, so crime victims were not usually involved.279 The Administrative 
Order explicitly requested that the Bureau of Prisons provide counsel with 
the defendant’s “medical records” for the six-month period prior to the filing 
of the motion for compassionate release, but made no mention of other types 
of records, including those involving crime victim perspectives and 
impacts.280 The U.S. Attorney’s Office would be given fourteen days to 
respond to a compassionate release motion,281 and the court would rely 
heavily on the U.S. Probation Office to help determine factors that influence 
the decision to release the defendant early, broadly considering “the needs 
and/or risk of the defendant.”282 
Thus, the existence of rights does not equate to the availability of 
rights for victims of crime. The type of offense may have an impact. With 
respect to property crime victims and political corruption, some courts and 
crime victims have taken a harsh stance despite a lack of violence. Bernie 
Madoff’s compassionate release petition was denied by the court, which took 
into account that 520 of his victims wrote to the court, of which 96% 
advocated for denial of release.283 In United States v. Gionfriddo, the District 
Court of Connecticut denied the compassionate release petition of a 69-year-
old inmate with asthma, convicted of mail and wire fraud, who had been a 
former attorney and mayor, stealing over one million dollars from legal 
clients and his disabled brother.284 The court took into account victim impact 
statements addressing the compassionate release petition, sharing that “[h]is 
most recent victims, the law firm and his brother, have voiced their objection 
 
278 In re Compassionate Release Provision of the First Step Act of 2018, supra 
note 276. 
279 Correspondence with Federal Public Defender for the Southern District of 
Illinois, Melissa Day (Jan. 12, 2021). “So far, I have not had any public hearings on 
cases with victims - and very few hearings whatsoever on the coronavirus 
compassionate release cases (I believe I had one or two hearings early on in the bond 
context, not in a straight compassionate release context). Most coronavirus 
compassionate release cases are simply decided on the briefs and review of the 
record. In my experience, most of these cases are ‘victimless’ in that they are drug 
cases.” Id. 




283 U.S. v. Madoff, 465 F. Supp. 3d 343 (S.D. N.Y. 2020). 
284 U.S. v. Gionfriddo, 2020 WL 3603754 
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to his early release, and expressed their concern that he might reoffend.”285 
In U.S. v. Davis, the Central District Court of California denied 
compassionate release of an offender convicted of fraud, contemplating that 
some of the elderly victims in the case had expressed fears of the offender 
should they submit a victim statement or should the offender be released.286  
One cannot help but question the imbalance in the number of victims 
willing to submit victim impact statements in cases involving nonviolent 
property crimes or on behalf of minor victims who likely have little say as to 
whether a family member submits a statement on their behalf. Far fewer cases 
involving adult victims of violent crime emerge upon review of COVID-19 
compassionate release cases to date.287 Whether the relative absence is due 
to fear, coercion, or love in a family-involved case, it does manifest that 
crime victim impact statements, in general, play a key role but cannot 
substantially assist the courts in ensuring equitable sentencing among 
offenders. In many cases, one must also question whether the Government 
actually complied with the Crime Victim Rights Act and notified the crime 
victim of the petition for compassionate release.288 If no public hearing is 
held on a petition for parole or early release, then the federal Crime Victim 
Rights Act would not require that the victim be given an opportunity to be 
heard.289 Even so, the courts will still speak for the victim in the absence of 
their express views, such as the District Court in the Eastern District of 
Virginia, which stated: “allowing this twice-convicted murderer to walk free 
 
285 Id. at *4. See also U.S. v. DiBiase, No. 12 Cr. 834 (ER), 2020 WL 5525629 
(S.D. N.Y. Sept. 14, 2020) (denying compassionate release for an offender convicted 
of racketeering, considering, in part, multiple victim impacts statements objecting to 
release and expressing their continued trauma); U.S. v. Israel, No. 05 CR 1039 (CM) 
2019 WL 6702522 (S.D. N.Y. Dec. 9, 2019) (considering the victim’s objection to 
compassionate release related to a massive investor fraud scheme). 
286 U.S. v. Davis, No. EDCR 17-00277 JLS, 2020 WL 6600169 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 
21, 2020). 
287 See, e.g., U.S. v. Cannon, No. 3:17-CR-174, 2021 WL 231100, at *3 (D. 
Conn. Jan. 22, 2021) (denying a petition for compassionate release from an offender 
with a history of domestic violence and firearms offenses in the interests of public 
safety, without mention that the family victims ever exercised (or were notified of) 
their right to communicate their perspective to the court). 
288 See U.S. v. Webster, Crim. No. 3:91cr138 (DJN), 2020 WL 618828 n.1 (E.D. 
Va. Feb. 10, 2020) (judicially chastising the U.S. Attorney for failing to present or 
mention attempts to notify the murder victim’s family in a compassionate release 
hearing). 
289 See supra notes 269 and 270. 
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before he has completed his sentence would be unjust to his victims and the 
public at large.”290 
The cases above represent instances in which the court directly based 
its decisions, at least in part, on victim impact statements related to COVID-
19 compassionate release petitions. The question remains whether crime 
victims and offenders, who are often members of the same communities, 
would inform the court and Bureau of Prisons as to the relevant factors more 
effectively than the present approach to the crisis in which state actors may 
disregard or sidestep individual interests and rights. In other cases, the court 
noted the position of crime victims, but ruled differently. More often than 
not, the perspective of the larger community potentially impacted was also 
not considered. Although prisoners may be housed far away from where they 
had lived, or where they may be released, during imprisonment, prisoners 
remain residents of a larger community beyond the prison walls. This was 
made apparent where COVID-19 transmission passed into the correctional 
facilities and into the neighboring communities as staff went to and from 
work at the facility and prisoners were released.291 Usurping the community 
and crime victim voice as a matter of state control disregards the porous 
nature of risks relevant to incarceration, where community voices are vital 
not only with regard to proportionality of sentencing, but also to public health 
risks. 
Overall, the apparent message of many of the judicial decisions 
addressing First Step Act compassionate release petitions is that traditional 
theories of retribution, deterrence, and proportionality to ensure justice are 
paramount, rather than rehabilitation, and the crime victim rights movement 
has been marginalized yet again. Or rather, a crime victim’s rights are 
perceived to be impactful only when a victim supports state control in the 
criminal justice system. For example, as the Southern District of Mississippi 
stated when denying a petition from a physically ill offender convicted of 
conspiracy to defraud the United States for an amount of at least $1.5 million, 
who was housed at a Louisiana correctional facility where the first inmate in 
the nation died of COVID-19:  
 
290 U.S. v. Webster, 2020 WL 618828, at *8. 
291 See Michael Ollove, How COVID-19 in Jails and Prisons Threatens Nearby 
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Longgrear did take responsibility for his actions and the 
Court considered that in imposing his sentence. However, 
Longgrear's charges were very serious and, as the recent 
victim letters show, many of his victims continue to suffer 
from his actions. Given that Longgrear has served less than 
30 percent of the imposed sentence, reducing his sentence at 
this juncture would not effectively “reflect the seriousness 
of the offense ... promote respect for the law ... [or] provide 
just punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
It would also not “afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct” under subsection (a)(2)(B).292 
When crime victims do exercise their right to submit a victim impact 
statement to influence sentencing or early release, the act occurs at a critical 
stage in the proceeding, deemed worthy of protection by the presence of 
defense counsel.293 This is so because “[a]mong the purposes of the CVRA 
is to make victims ‘full participants’ in the sentencing process and to ‘ensure 
that the district court doesn't discount the impact of the crime on the 
victims.’“294 Full participation by crime victims must be judicially screened 
and reviewed to ensure that participation is not unduly prejudicial, such as 
with the use of dramatic victim impact videos,295 or by inserting racial 
prejudice or other forms of improper bigotry into the proceeding.296 Courts 
must also anticipate that victims of crime may not all respond similarly, 
where studies have shown that victims exhibiting less emotion when 
delivering testimony and victim impact statements may influence courts to 
issue lower sentences, regardless of the victims’ intent.297 When all arbiters 
are individuals exercising judgment, subject to bias and cultural influence far 
removed from the community from which offenders and victims of crime 
reside, it makes sense that the interests of offenders and victims are heard 
clearly and consistently in court.  
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296 See José Felipé Anderson, Will the Punishment Fit the Victims? The Case for 
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That many victims of crime may choose not to exercise their rights 
at sentencing or upon early release motions during the pandemic is no 
different from the pattern seen in pre-pandemic times,298 except that the 
absence of public hearings and the procedural hurdles of early release 
motions during COVID-19 served as a formidable barrier to the exercise of 
crime victim rights. On an emotional level, victims of crime may not wish to 
revisit the trauma by continued involvement.299 They face a history of mutual 
distrust between the communities most in need of protection by the criminal 
justice system and the criminal justice state actors who judge who deserves 
protection.300 One way to move beyond this stalemate is a joining of forces. 
If the crime victim rights movement is willing to be more representative and 
inclusive alongside other civil rights advocates, including those representing 
criminal defendants, the justice system may be forced to reckon with the 
injustice of mass incarceration and the marginalization of crime victim rights. 
 
298 KENNEDY & SACCO, supra note 6, at 188 (reporting a 1994 study that found 
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Beliefs, and Support for Reparation and Punishment, CRIT. CRIM. 19 (2012) 
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delayed reporting of missing persons in tribal communities); Andrea J. Ritchie, 
#Sayhername: Racial Profiling and Police Violence Against Black Women, 41 
HARBINGER 187, 193 (Aug. 11, 2016) (“Young women of color, homeless and low-
income women, lesbian and trans women, and women who are (or are perceived to 
be) involved in the drug or sex trades are particularly targeted for sexual violence by 
police.”); Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal 
Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1219, 1224 (2000) (identifying data that suggests that low-income African-
American communities fear both crime victimization and police misconduct). 
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After all, each group arises from the communities most impacted by state 
criminal justice policies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When government decision-making in criminal sentencing becomes 
too removed from the community that was and will be impacted by the 
defendant’s conduct, then the public trust will erode and the justice system 
will lose its sense of justice.301 This has resulted in dispassionate mandatory 
minimum sentences for nonviolent conduct and mass incarceration, and it 
has resulted in victims of crime feeling marginalized and revictimized by the 
justice system. Advocates for both crime victims and convicted offenders 
need to work together to avoid the pitfalls of a remote government meting 
out justice that inevitably treats vulnerable communities with disregard.  
As debate over the criminal justice system’s priorities and 
effectiveness rage on, adding in the voices of crime victims, members often 
from the same communities as the convicted offenders would render great 
benefit. False depictions of typical crime victims as irrational and bent on 
vengeance and typical criminal offenders as dangerous and bent on terror 
have impeded much needed reform of the justice system. The atrocity of mass 
incarceration of America’s poorest young men and the rise of crime victims 
in low-income communities could have been avoided if the calls of their 
communities for better healthcare access, education, housing, and 
employment opportunities had been heard and respected.  
Crime victims, suffering the aftermath of the criminal act, often do 
have an interest in the goals of retribution and deterrence, but with meaning 
and parity such that making amends and the possibility of closure are made 
more possible. Retribution with proportionality, informed by the mental 
health benefits of contrition, offers respect for the autonomy and agency of 
offenders, even at a time when the majority of inmates have disabilities, 
including neuroatypical conditions. If the state opts to diminish the goal of 
retribution to the extent that it employs a paternalistic means of social control, 
 
301 See Scott Burris et al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local Innovation in 
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such as pharmaceutical incapacitation or extreme public health surveillance 
of offenders in a decarceral state, this could discount an offender’s capacity 
for accountability. Of course, this specter was not an option during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, when the courts in compassionate release cases 
focused not on rehabilitation programming and human potential, but on 
retribution and restraint, despite the lethality of the contagion in close 
quarters.  
Although crime victims often support retribution as a critical factor 
in criminal justice, crime victims are not without compassion, nor are they 
bereft of an understanding that the criminal justice system’s goals of 
deterrence and rehabilitation are meant to be protective of society. The 
majority of crime victims and communities impacted by crime also 
personally understand the circumstances leading to crime better than the 
court or justice system ever could. The community has a shared experience 
the challenges of lack of health care and mental health care, unemployment, 
and addiction, living in the same community or in the same household as the 
person convicted. A spousal victim of domestic violence may fully fear and 
understand the racial inequities that a call to 911 could bring to her abuser, a 
man more vulnerable to being incarcerated and less likely to obtain release 
during a pandemic. She herself may be at greater risk of contracting COVID-
19 due to lack of quality health care and housing, family obligations, and 
working in the public sphere.302 If the court and prison systems have failed 
to consider crime victim perspectives during this crisis due to expediency and 
longstanding neglect, they have also disregarded the voice of the defendant’s 
own community affected by the decision. It is time that advocates for both 
crime victims and offenders combine efforts to represent a stronger and more 
effective advocacy approach to the injustices of the criminal justice system, 
as revealed by the response of the courts when the pandemic was raging 
alongside pivotal and historic social justice movements in the United States.  
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